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INTRODUCTION 
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the 
following: This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to 
Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution.”1 
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the 
following: The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act is 
constitutionally authorized under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
supports the expansion of congressional authority beyond the explicit 
authorities that are directly discernible from the text. Additionally, the 
Preamble to the Constitution provides support of the authority to enact 
legislation to promote the General Welfare.”2 
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the 
following: . . . Congress is within its constitutionally prescribed role to 
direct the Environmental Protection Agency, a body which regulates 
interstate commerce under the auspices of Congress, to appoint a 
member of the Science Advisory Board based on the recommendation of 
the Secretary of Agriculture.”3 
Statements like the ones quoted here are suddenly flowing through 
Congress at the rate of several hundred per month. For the first time in 
history, members of the House of Representatives who introduce a bill 
must provide a statement explaining which clause of the Constitution 
gives Congress the authority to enact that bill into law. Constitutional 
authority statements (CASs) offer a window into how members of 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 157 Cong. Rec. H1525 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
for H.R. 877 introduced by Representative Clay). 
 2. 157 Cong. Rec. H1666 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
for H.R. 988 introduced by Representative Schiff). 
 3. 157 Cong. Rec. H1843 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
for H.R. 1104 introduced by Representative Stutzman). 
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Congress think about the Constitution—which often differs starkly from 
the judiciary‘s approach.  
Constitutional authority statements are the result of a rule change in 
the 112th House of Representatives. When each two-year session of 
Congress opens, the House re-adopts, with some changes, the rules 
governing its internal operations. At the opening of the 112th Congress 
in January 2011, the House of Representatives created a new rule 
requiring each bill or resolution introduced in the House to include a 
constitutional authority statement.
4
 This statement must identify ―the 
power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the 
bill or joint resolution.‖5 The CAS does not go into the text of the bill, 
but is included in the Congressional Record, published on the Library of 
Congress‘s THOMAS bill-tracking system, and printed on a cover sheet 
when the bill is distributed to Representatives. The Senate does not have 
a similar rule, but when a bill or joint resolution that was first passed in 
the Senate is brought to the House, the chair of the House committee 
with jurisdiction over the bill or resolution may introduce a CAS for the 
bill.
6
 
This is the first time in our nation‘s history that either house of 
Congress has required formal statements of constitutional authority for 
every bill its members introduce.
7
 The rule was somewhat controversial, 
not for its content, but because of the partisan motivation driving its 
adoption.
8
 The content is decidedly benign. The partisan zeal for 
                                                                                                                     
 4. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress, 
including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. During the 105th through 111th Congresses (1997–2010), the House of 
Representatives required that most committee reports must ―include a statement citing the 
specific powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill 
or joint resolution.‖ See H.R. Res. 5, Sec. 13, 105th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess., Jan. 7, 1997) 
(adopting rules for the 105th Congress). The rule applied only to bills that were reported out of 
committee, not to every bill that was introduced. The differences between the prior rule and the 
current one are discussed more fully in Subsection V.A.1. The committee report CAS rule was 
eliminated at the beginning of the 112th Congress. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(adopting rules for the 112th Congress and striking the provision that previously required CASs 
in committee reports); Adopting Rules for the 112th Congress, Section-by-Section Analysis, 
H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011), http://rules.house.gov/Media/file/PDF/HRes%205%20Sec-by-
Sec.pdf, at 1 (explaining that the new rule ―repeals the current requirement for a similar 
[constitutional authority] statement in committee reports‖). 
 8. Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency from 2008–10. One 
of the major complaints of the Republican opposition during this time was that the Democrats in 
government were ignoring the Constitution. Not only were they enacting controversial 
legislation that the Republicans claimed was unconstitutional, but they were brushing aside the 
Republicans‘ constitutional arguments against the bills. A major incident was House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi‘s dismissive answer, ―Are you serious?‖ when asked about the constitutionality of 
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adoption should not blind us to the potential long-term benefits of the 
measure.
9
 Congress has certain powers under the Constitution, and in a 
democratic society under the rule of law, government officials are 
expected not to usurp power that has not been granted to them.
10
 
Various mechanisms, from elections to legislative debate to judicial 
review, help guarantee that government officials act within their proper 
authority. Constitutional authority statements in Congress are a simple 
and straightforward self-monitoring mechanism to add to this arsenal. 
Had the rule been adopted early in America‘s constitutional history11 
and survived to the present day, it would likely have been wholly 
uncontroversial the entire time.
12
 
CASs are so unobjectionable that the main argument against them is 
that they will be useless. Opponents claim that the rule change was a 
meaningless piece of political theater that would waste time and money 
but change nothing.
13
 Legislators can pluck out any old clause of the 
                                                                                                                     
health care reform legislation. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the 
Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 193, 234 (2011) (discussing Speaker Pelosi‘s statement 
as an instigator and rallying cry of Tea Party organizers for constitutional discussion in 
Congress). Republicans won control of the House partially on the promise to take the 
Constitution seriously. See Republicans in Congress, A Pledge to America: A new governing 
agenda built on the Priorities of Our Nation, the Principles We Stand for, & America‟s 
Founding Values, http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-to-
america.pdf, at 33 (―We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause 
citing the specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.‖). The CAS rule is 
one implementation of that promise. See Delivering Reform to Congress, http://www.gop.gov/in 
depth/pledge/reform (citing the changes to the House of Representatives rules as fulfilling the 
election promise to ―Adhere to the Constitution‖). 
 9. See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the 
Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 508 (2009) (―[G]ood-government reforms tend to be adopted 
either after spectacular failures . . . or as packages offered by political movements that organize 
support around a reasonably large reform agenda.‖). 
 10. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (noting that ―[t]he dangers of 
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized‖).  
 11. Despite the lack of a rule requiring an explicit statement of constitutional authority, 
early Congresses debated the constitutional authority for their actions regularly, as a ―threshold 
question.‖ See David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the 
Constitution, 1789–1861, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 20 (Neal Devins & Keith E. 
Whittington, eds., 2005). 
 12. An individual CAS may be controversial if it expresses a contested interpretation of 
the Constitution, but the idea of requiring the CAS does not thereby become controversial. In 
fact, differing interpretations of the Constitution reflected in CASs should lend additional 
credence to the practice of requiring the statements, because they help members of Congress and 
private citizens recognize and engage in important debates over the meaning of the Constitution. 
 13. See, e.g., Pete Kasperowicz, Democrat: Citing Constitution Will Cost Taxpayers 
$570K, THE HILL‘S FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Jan. 10, 2011, 1:07 PM),  http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/floor-action/house/136995-democrat-citing-constitutional-authority-in-bills-will-cost-you 
(reporting objections that the bill will waste money on administrative costs); Jackie Kucinich, 
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Constitution to attach to their dubiously constitutional bills, and trust 
that nobody will call them on it because politics and policy always 
trump constitutional objections.
14
  
I disagree with this assessment. Constitutional authority statements 
alone may not change anything. I argue, however, that they are a useful 
tool for increasing Congress‘s deliberations about the Constitution. 
Constitutional authority statements perform three important 
functions. First, they attempt to answer a fundamental question that 
should be asked about all legislation: whether Congress has the 
authority to enact a law on the subject. Second, they can trigger further 
discussions about constitutionality within Congress, which could help 
legislators make more robust and considered decisions. Third, they 
provide a window for judges, scholars, and others into what 
Representatives think about the Constitution. 
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I discusses Congress‘s 
authority and institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution. Part II 
situates constitutional authority statements within existing debates over 
constitutional interpretation outside the courts. Congress must 
necessarily make decisions about constitutional meaning when it 
legislates. Most scholars believe Congress has at least some 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution, while others think 
Congress should follow Supreme Court doctrine even when Congress 
disagrees.
15
 Regardless of which theory is correct, Congress needs to 
consider constitutionality (however defined) when legislating. CASs 
increase Congress‘s capacity to do so by creating an institutional 
mechanism that prioritizes constitutional analysis. 
Part III examines issues involving the substantive content of 
constitutional authority statements. The rule requires ―specific‖ 
statements, but does not define ―specific.‖16 Nor is it clear how a 
Representative can cite authority that flows from the structure of the 
Constitution rather than from a textual provision. Additionally, this 
section examines enforcement of the rule to ensure that members follow 
its requirements. 
Part IV turns to the question of judicial review. Now that 
Congress—at least, a portion of Congress—takes an official position 
                                                                                                                     
GOP Educating Members About New Constitutionality Rule, ROLL CALL (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201826-1.html (reporting objections that the new rule 
―deal[s] with a problem that doesn‘t really exist‖); Ben Weyl, Parties Spar Over Interpretation 
of „Constitutional Authority‟ Rule, CQ TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011),  2011 WLNR 3393485.  
 14. See, e.g., Kasperowicz, supra note 13 (reporting objection that the statements will be 
largely ignored). 
 15. See infra notes 16 and 42 and accompanying text.   
 16. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess. 2011).  
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about the constitutional basis of every single law it enacts, how should 
the courts treat this information? Should the courts give some amount of 
deference to Congress‘s constitutional statements? More importantly, 
should courts consider only Congress‘s cited constitutional authority, or 
may courts find an independent justification for upholding a law 
regardless of what the CAS has cited? This Article argues that CASs are 
a very weak form of legislative history, are for the most part not written 
with judicial interpretation in mind, and are therefore not particularly 
useful to courts. Judges should not, and probably will not, strike down 
statutes because of a CASs mistaken constitutional interpretations. 
Part V examines several ways that Congress can, if it desires, 
strengthen the CAS requirement. Some of these reforms are aimed at 
making CASs better at what they currently do: enhancing congressional 
deliberation. Others attempt to make CASs into more authoritative 
statements that could be used in court interpretations. Both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate should evaluate the costs and benefits of 
a variety of ways of implementing a CAS rule. 
Throughout this Article, I make various empirical statements about 
the actual constitutional authority statements that Representatives have 
written. These claims are drawn from a complete list of all the CASs for 
bills introduced from January through April 2011, the first four months 
that the rule was in effect, which I compiled and categorized. The 
database contains 1,653 bills and 56 joint resolutions. In some ways, 
this may be an unrepresentative sample. Compliance with the rule might 
be more zealous when it is first adopted, then fall off later. Or the other 
way around—compliance might improve as Representatives and their 
staffs become more familiar with constitutional analysis. Additionally, 
party leaders often choose to introduce the most important bills on their 
legislative agendas at the beginning of the session, and those bills might 
have different CAS attributes than more ordinary legislation (or more 
rushed legislation) introduced later. I gathered this data to provide 
preliminary information about what is happening, and I do not intend to 
make any strong claims about what CASs will universally look like. 
The goal of the present Article is not to reach empirical conclusions, but 
to explore theoretical questions with some real-world illustrations. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN CONGRESS 
Fundamentally, a constitutional authority statement is a 
congressional interpretation of the Constitution. To determine which 
part of the Constitution authorizes a bill, the author of the statement 
must reach some opinions about what the Constitution means. A 
preliminary question about the CAS rule, then, is whether Congress has 
the authority to interpret the Constitution at all. Further, does Congress 
have the capacity to interpret the Constitution correctly? This Part 
6
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summarizes the scholarly literature, which mainly argues that 
constitutional interpretation in Congress is important, but suggests a 
variety of reasons to justify it. This Part then argues that whatever the 
outermost limits of Congress‘s interpretive capacity are, writing 
constitutional authority statements is certainly within those limits. More 
importantly, the rule requiring sponsors to write CASs is itself an 
institution that enhances Congress‘s ability to interpret the Constitution. 
A.  Congress‟s Authority to Interpret the Constitution 
1.  Theories of Constitutional Interpretation in Congress 
Most scholars believe that the Supreme Court is not the sole 
authorized interpreter of the Constitution.
17
 A variety of theories claim, 
for different reasons and to different extents, that people other than 
judges have some responsibility for constitutional interpretation. 
Determining the correctness of these theories is far beyond the scope of 
this Article. A brief description of some of these theories—popular 
constitutionalism, departmentalism, and theories about the political 
question doctrine, the presumption of constitutionality, and the oath of 
office—shows that a wide range of people should be interested in 
constitutional authority statements from Congress.  
Popular Constitutionalism is a broad and somewhat difficult to 
define
18
 family of theories.
19
 It argues, most basically, that 
constitutional interpretation should not rest solely in the hands of a 
judicial elite.
20
 Popular constitutionalists believe that the Constitution 
should be interpreted in some way by the citizens themselves,
21
 or by 
                                                                                                                     
 17. This scholarly consensus is relatively recent. In 1966, scholars recognized a consensus 
on the opposite theory, judicial supremacy. See, e.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 13 (1966). 
 18. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1594, 1602, 1628 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (questioning whether the concept of 
―popular constitutionalism‖ can be defined in a noncontradictory way at all)); David E. Pozen, 
Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053 (2010) (―It 
can be difficult to get a firm grip on what people mean by ‗popular constitutionalism.‘‖). 
 19. For complete expositions of various theories of popular constitutionalism, see 
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6–32 (1999). 
 20. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 6–32 (1999); Alexander & Solum, supra note 18, 
at 1608 (characterizing Professor Kramer‘s theory loosely as ―the people themselves have an 
enemy, and that enemy is ‗judicial supremacy‘‖); Pozen, supra note 18, at 2055–56. 
 21. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 18, at 2057–58. 
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institutions that are closer and more responsive to citizens than 
appointed federal judges are.
22
 
Congress‘s constitutional authority statements should interest 
popular constitutionalists because the legislature is a more 
representative institution than the judiciary.
23
 Constitutional 
interpretation in Congress still differs significantly from interpretation 
by the people themselves, so some popular constitutionalists may view 
CASs as yet another elitist institution that removes power from the 
people. Others, however, will see more robust congressional attention to 
the Constitution as a step in the right direction, bringing the 
Constitution to a more democratically responsive institution than the 
federal judiciary.
24
 Popular constitutionalists will be interested to 
investigate whether Congress‘s statements about the Constitution more 
closely track popular understanding than the Supreme Court‘s 
statements. 
Departmentalism
25
 is somewhat related to popular constitutionalism, 
in that it argues strongly for interpretive authority outside the courts.
26
 
However, instead of placing authority in the public, departmentalism 
places authority in all three branches of the federal government.
27
 The 
allocation of interpretive authority among the branches might be equal 
or unequal. Each branch might have its own independent sphere of 
authority, or the branches might overlap and contest authority with each 
other.
28
 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See generally Pozen, supra note 18 (advocating judicial elections as an institution for 
implementing popular constitutionalism). 
 23. See MORGAN, supra note 17, at 29 (citing Congress‘s representative nature as one 
reason it should be good at handling constitutional questions). See generally JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9 (1980) (discussing the problem 
that unelected judges pose to democratic theory).  
 24. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and 
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (noting a possible criticism of judicial 
supremacy as ―undermin[ing] the authority of the people‘s representatives to determine the 
content of the Constitution‖). See generally TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 17 (treating 
congressional constitutional interpretation as a form of popular constitutionalism).  
 25. For major works on the theory of departmentalism, see generally MORGAN, supra note 
17, at 346; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270–72 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 219–27 (1994). 
 26. See Post & Siegel, supra note 24, at 1031–32 (noting that popular constitutionalism 
and judicial supremacy both advocate removing some of the Supreme Court‘s power to be the 
binding interpreter of the Constitution). 
 27. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 18, at 1609–10 (―The basic premise of 
departmentalism is that interpretive authority is shared by the three branches of government.‖). 
See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: 
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 2004). 
 28. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 18, at 1609–15 (describing several 
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Departmentalists focus heavily, though not entirely, on constitutional 
interpretation and decision making in the executive branch. This may be 
in part because the Executive Branch produces reasonably well-
organized and accessible published statements about the Constitution 
(though not as organized, accessible, and thorough as the Supreme 
Court Reporter). The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of 
Justice produces numerous analyses of constitutional issues, many of 
which are published either immediately or after a delay, allowing 
scholars to analyze these opinions easily.
29
 Administrative agencies also 
publish constitutional analysis in rules and adjudications. Congressional 
materials are not nearly as well-organized or accessible as Executive 
Branch ones, and where Congressional materials are available, lawyers 
and scholars are often simply unaware that they exist. 
Constitutional authority statements in Congress should obviously 
interest advocates of departmentalism. The balance in constitutional 
interpretation has shifted heavily toward the courts over the past two 
hundred years.
30
 Any assertion of interpretive responsibility by 
Congress helps move the balance back in the departmentalist direction. 
Departmentalists will be interested in the specific details of how 
Congress should implement CASs, how CASs are used in further debate 
within Congress, and how the Executive Branch and courts treat 
Congress‘s statements. 
The Political Question Doctrine
31
 provides another reason to pay 
attention to Congress‘s interpretations of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has held that many questions of constitutional interpretation are 
textually committed to another branch of government and cannot be 
answered by the courts.
32
 Congress thus frequently deals with issues 
                                                                                                                     
departmentalist theories); Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of 
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1112–13 (2011) (arguing that ―there is (sometimes) affirmative 
value in promoting the means for interbranch tension and conflict without any sort of superior 
body that can articulate a global, principled, final, and binding decision on the matter‖).  
 29. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (analyzing published OLC opinions). 
 30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958) (declaring that the Supreme 
Court‘s interpretations of the Constitution are binding on Congress). 
 31. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 330 (2002) 
(stating the importance of the political question doctrine).  
 32. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 707, 725–27 (1985); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a 
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (―Consider the large domain of 
constitutional decisionmaking over which the Supreme Court has essentially ceded control to 
the political branches by articulating deferential standards of review, limits on standing and 
justiciability, and the political-question doctrine. Impeachments and many issues involving 
electoral processes generally lie within this domain, and other questions do as well.‖); id. at 
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over which the courts have no jurisdiction.
33
 These questions include 
impeachment,
34
 appointments, the accuracy of enrolled bills,
35
 and 
expulsion or exclusion of the legislature‘s members. 
On some of these questions, Congress is the final and only 
interpreter of the Constitution. On others, Congress shares interpretive 
authority with the President. Formal statements about Congress‘s 
understanding of the Constitution on these subjects, then, are most 
welcome. Statements that are intended to spark further debate if 
controversial are even more welcome. 
The Presumption of Constitutionality doctrine tells judges that they 
should assume that Congress is complying with the Constitution.
36
 The 
presumption of constitutionality is the doctrine that courts should ―defer 
to or presume the correctness of the judgment of the legislative branch 
that a statute it enacts is constitutional.‖37 The presumption can, of 
course, be overcome in court, but courts will go out of their way to look 
for a rational basis Congress might have relied on to justify the statute‘s 
constitutionality. The act of passing the statute, alone, is seen as a 
congressional statement that the statute is constitutional in Congress‘s 
opinion. 
The presumption of constitutionality applies regardless of the level 
of discussion that took place in Congress. There may have been 
extensive constitutional debate about a bill, or the debate may have 
focused entirely on policy issues instead of constitutional ones, or the 
bill may have been passed in a stealthy manner with no recorded 
legislative history at all. The courts do not even look to legislative 
history to decide whether to apply the presumption of constitutionality; 
they simply apply it for every statute.
38
 As some scholars have pointed 
                                                                                                                     
1284–85 (listing constitutional questions the Supreme Court has declined to answer). 
 33. See MORGAN, supra note 17, at 11. 
 34. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993) (discussing the Senate‘s 
unreviewable power to create procedures for impeachment trials). 
 35. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892) (holding that a bill 
signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate must be accepted by the 
courts as having passed both houses, regardless of evidence to the contrary). 
 36. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 151–52 (2004) (arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is inconsistent with 
the original meaning of the Constitution and advocating that it be replaced with a presumption 
of liberty). See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447 (claiming that deference to legislatures about constitutional 
decisions makes more sense than deference to legislatures about facts); James B. Thayer, The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) 
(arguing that the power to determine whether a law is constitutional belongs to the legislature, 
not the judiciary). 
 37. BARNETT, supra note 36, at 151–52. 
 38. The level of discussion about a bill‘s constitutionality is not necessarily correlated 
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out, this can lead to a cyclical deference, in which nobody actually 
makes a decision about constitutionality: If Congress is avoiding the 
question in the belief that the courts should answer the question, but the 
courts then apply a presumption that Congress has already decided that 
a statute is constitutional, then nobody ever does an independent 
analysis.
39
 
Constitutional authority statements can make Congress‘s 
constitutional deliberations more frequent and more transparent. 
Scholars concerned with the presumption of constitutionality should see 
this as a welcome development, and should be interested to see whether 
judges are more or less likely to accept Congress‘s explicit 
justifications, as opposed to its implicit ones. 
The Oath of Office provides another potential reason to believe that 
constitutional authority statements in Congress are important. All 
federal and state government officials are constitutionally required to 
take an oath to support the Constitution.
40
 It is not simply a formality.
41
 
                                                                                                                     
with its constitutionality. Congress may choose not to discuss a bill‘s constitutionality because it 
is so obviously constitutional that it does not merit debate time, or because it is so obviously 
unconstitutional (but politically popular) that nobody dare bring it up, or because nobody cares 
whether it is constitutional or not. Some Members of Congress may also hold the view that 
decisions about constitutionality should be left to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra 
note 17, at 3–10 (recounting evidence that a significant minority of Members of Congress think 
constitutional questions should be considered only by the courts, not by Congress itself). This 
view, combined with the presumption of constitutionality, could lead to a vicious cycle of 
deference in which each branch was deferring to another and no branch ever made an 
independent decision about constitutionality. See id. at 11 (―[I]t is hard to defend judicial 
presumption [that acts of Congress are constitutional] unless Congress itself deals 
conscientiously with constitutional questions.‖). 
 39. See Randy Barnett, Double Deference and the House GOP‟s Fair-Weather 
Federalism, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 2011, 12:46 PM) http://www.volokh.com 
/2011/05/22/double-deference-and-the-house-gops-fair-weather-federalism/ (―Thus does the 
Court defer to Congress, while the House Republicans—just like Congressional Democrats—
defer to the Court‘s assessment of constitutionality.‖); Randy Barnett, Professor Jost Replies, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 19, 2009, 9:37 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/09/19/ 
professor-jost-replies (―[I]f the Supreme Court adopts a ‗presumption of constitutionality‘ by 
which it defers to the Congress‘s judgment of the constitutionality of its actions . . . and the 
Congress adopts [the] view that ‗unconstitutionality‘ means whatever the Supreme Court says, 
then NO ONE EVER evaluates whether a act of Congress is or is not authorized by the 
Constitution.‖); Randy Barnett, This Is What Courts Defer to?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 
3, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/03/this-is-what-courts-defer-to/ (noting 
that the congressional ―judgment‖ courts defer to is often either a prediction of what the courts 
are likely to do or a complete abdication of responsibility, not an independent decision); see also 
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator‟s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 585, 599 (1975) (arguing that Congress should apply stricter constitutional tests on itself 
because rational basis review implicitly delegates constitutional decision-making from courts to 
Congress). 
 40. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
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Some legislators have spoken about the oath as a serious factor in their 
decision making.
42
 
Leaders in the House of Representatives themselves cited the oath of 
office as a justification for adopting the CAS rule. In a memo explaining 
the new rule to Members, the leadership stated, ―While the courts have 
the power to overturn an Act of Congress on the basis that it is 
unconstitutional, Members of Congress have a responsibility, as clearly 
indicated by the oath of office each Members takes, to adhere to the 
Constitution.‖43 
Observers interested in the oath of office arguments should support 
constitutional authority statements because CASs are a way of making 
sure that legislators are not violating their oaths to uphold the 
Constitution.  
Finally, anyone who believes that Congress should not be 
interpreting the Constitution in any authoritative way should be 
interested in constitutional authority statements. This group is relatively 
small, as most scholars think Congress has some interpretive 
responsibility.
44
 Still, some highly respected scholars have come out in 
favor of strong judicial supremacy.
45
 To people in this camp, 
Congress‘s reassertion of its interpretive authority may be a sign of 
danger. Judicial supremacists, like departmentalists, will be interested to 
see how the courts treat these new constitutional authority statements. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See generally Louis Fisher, supra note 32, at 718–19; Steve Sheppard, What Oaths 
Meant to the Founding Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273 
(2009), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/SHEPPARD_2009_273.pdf. 
 42. See Sen. Russ Feingold, Upholding an Oath to the Constitution: A Legislator‟s 
Responsibilities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (noting several instances of amending legislation to 
make it constitutional as fulfillment of his oath of office). 
 43. COMM. ON RULES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, New Constitutional Authority 
Requirement for Introduced Legislation (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.rules.house.gov/about/ 
PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsID=72 [hereinafter Rules Committee Memo]. 
 44. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1306 (―Normatively, most mainstream 
theories of constitutionalism deem congressional review for constitutionality to be an 
affirmative good, regardless of the scope of subsequent judicial review.‖). 
 45. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy 
and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2004); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring that ―the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution‖ and that federal and state legislators are bound to follow the Supreme Court‘s 
interpretations); MORGAN, supra note 17, at 10 (laying out the principles of what he calls the 
―judicial monopoly‖ theory, but not endorsing it); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its 
Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 408 (2003) (arguing that critiques of judicial supremacy 
―miss the mark‖ and that ―advocates for changing longstanding practices bear the burden of 
persuasion for changing them‖). 
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Before moving on, two things bear mentioning. First, this discussion 
has raised several large questions that a single article cannot answer, 
and the rest of this Article will continue to raise more questions. To 
name a few: whether Congress‘s interpretations are consistent with the 
Court‘s interpretations, whether Congress‘s interpretations are more 
consistent with popular understanding than the Court‘s interpretations 
are, whether CASs are discussed in Congress after they are written, how 
the Executive Branch and courts will treat constitutional authority 
statements,
46
 and whether CASs make Congress less likely to 
accidentally or intentionally violate the Constitution. Constitutional 
authority statements provide a huge field for further research. I hope 
this Article can serve as a launching point for future discussions of these 
and other issues. 
Second, a note about party politics is in order. Since 2008, 
Republicans have been loudly proclaiming that Congress, and the 
people themselves, should take the Constitution more seriously.
47
 Some 
(but not all) Democrats, in response, have been claiming that the 
Constitution is the domain of the courts—that is, taking the judicial 
supremacy position.
48
 This partisan alignment is a very recent 
development, largely in response to political circumstances.
49
 And it is 
almost certainly a transient phenomenon. If Republicans gain undivided 
power again, constitutional arguments in Congress will come more 
often from Democrats. A study undertaken in 1999–2000, an era when 
the Constitution was less salient as a political issue, found no 
relationship between party affiliation and a Congressperson‘s views of 
congressional authority to interpret the Constitution.
50
 
                                                                                                                     
 46. This Article answers some questions about judicial use of constitutional authority 
statements in Part III, but the discussion is entirely theoretical because no court has discussed 
the statements yet. 
 47. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 8, at 235–36; see Republicans in Congress, supra note 
8, at 33 (―We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause citing the 
specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.‖).  
 48. See, e.g., Kasperowicz, supra note 13 (―[Democratic Representative Corrine] Brown 
reiterated other Democratic arguments against the [CAS] rule, including that it is the job of the 
courts to decide when Congress has overstepped its bounds.‖).  
 49. During the passage of the health care reform legislation, Democrats had a majority in 
the House of Representatives and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, making their 
legislative agenda almost unstoppable. 
 50. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation, 
in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 50–51 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington, eds., 
2005). 
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2.  Compliance (or Noncompliance) with Doctrine 
A major question within this field is whether Congress should 
comply with Supreme Court doctrine on constitutional questions, or 
whether Congress should reach its own, independent decisions about 
constitutional meaning. Regardless of which view is correct, CASs are a 
helpful tool. They can be used to explore doctrine as well as to reach 
independent conclusions—and in fact, Congress has already been using 
them in both ways. 
Even if Congress does assert independent authority in some 
situations, most of the time Congress wants laws to comply with the 
Supreme Court‘s understanding of the Constitution. Perhaps Congress 
thinks the Court is doing an excellent job of developing the right to 
equal protection, for instance, and wants to make sure that new laws 
comply with all of the Supreme Court doctrine on the subject. Or 
perhaps Congress fears it would lose an all-out battle with the Court on 
a particular constitutional issue, does not want to impose the costs of 
litigation on parties who would challenge the statute,
51
 or prefers to 
maintain stability in the law rather than the uncertainty that would flow 
from a disputed interpretation. In those cases, Congress might choose to 
write a statute that accomplishes as much of its own agenda as possible 
while not running afoul of Court doctrine. 
Congress‘s relationship to doctrine can sometimes be more complex 
than simply accepting or rejecting it. Take, for example, the issue of 
protests at military funerals. The Supreme Court recently decided in 
Snyder v. Phelps
52
 that the First Amendment protects the speech of 
protesters at a military funeral when the protest complied with state law 
regulating the time, place, and manner of the protest. The protesters 
were therefore not liable to family members of the deceased for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
53
 One proposed 
congressional response to this decision was to reduce the likelihood that 
emotional distress would occur without contradicting Supreme Court 
doctrine on the subject.
54
 H.R. 961 proposes to increase the limits on 
funeral protests without banning them outright, and its constitutional 
authority statement summarizes the prevailing doctrine: ―The First 
Amendment to the Constitution permits time, place and manner 
restrictions on free speech.‖55 The sponsor of this bill clearly disagrees 
                                                                                                                     
 51. See BAMBERGER, RECKLESS LEGISLATION 49–50 (2000) (discussing the disruptive 
real-world effects of having a statute struck down); MORGAN, supra note 17, at 11 (stating that 
―sole reliance on court determination may present difficulties‖). 
 52. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 53. See id. at 1215–19. 
 54. Safe Haven for Heroes Act of 2011, H.R. 961, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).  
 55. 157 Cong. Rec. H1620 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
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with the outcome of Snyder—that protesters were allowed to gather 
near a military funeral—but agrees with the general doctrine that led to 
that result.
56
 
The Constitution and what the Court says about the Constitution are 
not the same thing, but people sometimes talk about them as if they 
were.
57
 The requirement for a constitutional authority statement could 
be interpreted to include reference to court cases that are relevant to the 
issue being discussed. Several of the CASs in the database do in fact 
cite to Supreme Court cases
58
 or mention court doctrine
59
 in addition to 
citing provisions of the Constitution itself. Many (probably even most) 
others are surely citing portions of the Constitution in ways that accord 
with the Court‘s interpretation of those provisions, though they do not 
cite the doctrine directly. 
Interpreters of statutes routinely assume that Congress is not only 
aware of the statutory background against which it legislates,
60
 but also 
                                                                                                                     
for H.R. 961 introduced by Representative Ruppersberger). 
 56. See Md. Congressman Wants To Prevent Funeral Protests, WBAL TV, March 8, 
2011, available at http://www.wbaltv.com/r/27118214/detail.html (―Ruppersberger‘s aides said 
they think the Safe Haven for Heroes Act is constitutional because it does not directly challenge 
the Supreme Court‘s free speech ruling.‖); Press Release, Ruppersberger Announces Legislation 
To Prevent Protests During Military Funerals (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://dutch.house.gov/ 
2011/03/ruppersberger-announces-legislation-to-prevent-protests-during-military-funerals.shtml. 
 57. See generally BAMBERGER, supra note 51 (accusing legislators of ignoring ―the 
Constitution,‖ by which he largely means Supreme Court doctrine). 
 58. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H1524 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 869 introduced by Representative Denham) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3;  United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940));  157 Cong. Rec. 
H1525 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 873 introduced by 
Representative Lewis) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I (―Article I of the United States 
Constitution . . . further clarified and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.‖)); 
157 Cong. Rec. H1986 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 
1152 introduced by Representative Rangel) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 and 14; 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)). 
 59. See 157 Cong. Rec. H2916 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 1644 introduced by Representative Rivera) (mentioning the ―Interstate 
Travel Regulation‖ of the Commerce Clause). This probably refers to ―use of the channels of 
interstate commerce,‖ which is the first category of the Supreme Court‘s doctrine regarding 
three categories of commerce regulation. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
See also 157 Cong. Rec. H1620 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for 
H.R. 961 introduced by Representative Ruppersberger) (―The First Amendment to the 
Constitution permits time, place and manner restrictions on free speech.‖). 
 60. The in pari materia canon, which presumes that a legislature uses the same words 
consistently throughout statutes on the same subject, is one example of this assumption in 
statutory interpretation. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 39 (2012). Another is the canon against implied repeals, 
which assumes that a legislature intended its new statute to fit with prior law on the subject if 
possible, without asking whether the legislature even considered the prior statute. See id. § 55.  
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is aware of judicial interpretations of prior law.
61
 Congress is assumed 
to legislate in light of all of that existing legal background. Many 
commentators have pointed out that these assumptions are clearly 
false.
62
 The law is too big and too complicated for all of the effects of 
new legislation to be understood ex ante. Yet the assumptions remain. 
Constitutional authority statements can be thought of as a way of 
making these assumptions more accurate in fact. Congress is attempting 
to become aware of, and to comply with, a portion of the relevant 
existing law before it enacts new legislation—the portion that involves 
the Constitution and perhaps court interpretations of the Constitution. 
When Congress does wish to challenge the Supreme Court‘s 
interpretation of a constitutional provision, a CAS can help make that 
challenge more explicit. A CAS might cite the contested provision of 
the Constitution and state that Congress‘s interpretation differs from the 
Court‘s. Or the differing interpretation might be only implied, but 
would be revealed through comparison of the statute and its CAS with 
existing doctrine.  
The usefulness of CASs, then, does not depend on a belief that 
Congress should interpret the Constitution independently. CASs can be 
used either to comply with, to fight against, or to ignore Supreme Court 
interpretations. We should expect to find a combination of these 
approaches, as CASs are written by Representatives holding different 
views. 
B.  Congress‟s Capacity to Interpret the Constitution 
Scholars interested in Congress‘s authority to interpret the 
Constitution often find themselves arguing over Congress‘s institutional 
capacity to interpret the Constitution. If Congress is terrible at 
constitutional interpretation, departmentalism and the political question 
doctrine start to seem like really bad ideas. Not surprisingly, scholars 
differ over how capable Congress is at doing robust constitutional 
interpretation. 
What does it mean to say that Congress does or does not have 
sufficient capacity to interpret the constitution? Problems of capacity 
can be divided into three categories. First, Congress might simply forget 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 375 (2010) (describing the ―reenactment rule‖ canon, which holds that a 
legislative reenactment of a statute without changes incorporates prior judicial and 
administrative interpretations of the statute). 
 62. See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) (―[M]ost Supreme Court opinions never come to the attention 
of Congress.‖). 
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to consider constitutional questions.
63
 If potential unconstitutionality is 
frequently overlooked, Congress will rarely have the opportunity to 
make constitutional decisions. 
Second, Congress might lack the motivation to consider 
constitutional questions, or to consider those questions honestly. With a 
limited amount of time available for debate on each bill, members may 
choose to focus their attention on policy considerations and political 
maneuvering rather than questions of constitutionality.
64
 Alternatively, 
members might make constitutional arguments only strategically to 
further their political goals, not out of actual concern for 
constitutionality.
65
 
Third, members of Congress, their staffs, and support agencies may 
not have enough knowledge or expertise to analyze constitutional issues 
properly. Even if they make their best attempt to determine whether a 
bill is constitutional or not, they may get the answer wrong more often 
than not, or may simply be unable to reach a conclusion. 
The exact limits of Congress‘s capacity to interpret the Constitution 
are difficult to quantify. Congress certainly has some capacity to 
analyze constitutional questions. Members can and do make 
constitutional decisions when important issues come to their attention. 
They take advantage of expert witnesses at hearings, their legally 
trained staff, constitutional experts at the Congressional Research 
Service, and other resources to help them make these decisions.
66
 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See, e.g., Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1298 (discussing the ―fire-alarm 
model‖ of constitutional monitoring, in which members of Congress do not consider 
constitutional problems with a bill unless an outside interest group brings those problems to 
their attention). 
 64. See BAMBERGER, supra note 51, at 66–69 (providing an example of how constitutional 
considerations can take a back seat in debates over hot-button political issues); Garrett & 
Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1300 (criticizing the ―fire alarm model‖ of constitutional analysis in 
Congress); Mikva, supra note 62, at 587 (―For the most part, legislative debate does not explore 
the constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job 
of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.‖). 
 65. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 17, at 21–24 (describing the interrelatedness of policy 
and constitutional questions and noting that ―[t]he dynamism of the struggle for policy with its 
mood of urgency and immediacy makes the constitutional appeal seem at the least pointless, at 
the worst sheer treason‖). But see Jeffrey K. Tulis, On Congress and Constitutional 
Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2009) (―[A] separation of powers system [can] tie the 
ambitions of officeholders to the duties of the office in such a manner as to produce impressive 
arguments, however insincere or inauthentic. These arguments take on a life of their own, and 
far from being merely the cover or rationalization for private interest and ambition (of ‗real‘ 
politics), they become the substance and action of politics itself.‖). 
 66. See generally Fisher, supra note 32, at 730. 
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Further, changes to Congress‘s internal rules and institutional structures 
can enhance its capacity to interpret the Constitution.
67
  
This Section argues that constitutional authority statements are 
within Congress‘s current interpretive capacity, and are themselves an 
institutional rule that enhances future capacity. 
1.  Requiring Consideration 
The first two capacity problems—that Congress forgets or is not 
motivated to consider the Constitution—are reduced simply by making 
constitutional deliberation a requirement. This is exactly what the 
current CAS rule does. Sponsors can no longer forget to consider the 
constitutionality of a bill because at the time of introduction, they are 
required  include a CAS. If they forget to include the CAS, the bill will 
be rejected and the sponsor will have to reintroduce it with a proper 
CAS. Unlike a congressional requirement to read the text of each bill, 
another currently popular initiative aimed at increasing deliberative 
lawmaking, CASs can easily be required and enforced.
68
 
Members other than the sponsor are more likely to notice 
constitutional issues as well. When the CAS is printed together with the 
bill, Members will notice it and might think of related constitutional 
issues as well. Simply putting the initial statement in front of them can 
increase the amount of thought and deliberation that occurs. 
Lack of motivation is a more difficult problem to address. Members 
will be forced to comply with the CAS requirement to a certain extent, 
but there are ways to evade the spirit of the rule while complying with 
the letter.
 
Nonspecificity, failure to mention anything in the actual 
Constitution, and simply ignoring the invitation to discuss the CAS 
during later deliberations will be continuing problems. Still, a 
requirement a minimal amount of constitutional analysis overcomes 
some of the inertia. 
Part of the motivation problem is that constitutional analysis in 
Congress is a public good produced by individuals, and therefore will 
be underproduced. Everyone benefits when Congress is presented with 
information about potential constitutional problems before a bill is 
finalized. But creating that information takes time away from a 
representative‘s other important tasks, including those that may have 
more effect on reelection or the enactment of the Representative‘s 
policy preferences.
69
 Legislators thus have less incentive to research the 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See generally Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32 (proposing institutional changes to 
enhance Congress‘s capacity to interpret the Constitution). 
 68. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 
141–42 (2011). 
 69. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1301–02. 
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information themselves, but prefer when others produce the information 
for them.
70
 
CASs also address this problem to a certain extent. They spread the 
cost of constitutional interpretation roughly equally among 
Representatives.
71
 Some Representatives will choose to introduce more 
bills than others, raising their costs slightly, and some will introduce 
more constitutionally complex or controversial bills. But placing the 
initial burden of constitutional interpretation on the sponsor of the bill is 
a reasonably fair method. 
2.  Capacity for Constitutional Authority Statements 
The third complaint, regarding lack of constitutional expertise 
among members of Congress and their staffs, is a serious one. 
Congress‘s current interpretive capacity is probably less than that of the 
courts, but it is hard to evaluate this with any accuracy.
72
 For the 
purposes of this Article, however, we need not explore the limits of 
Congress‘s interpretive capacity. The amount of interpretation required 
for a CAS is small, and should be well within the limits of any member 
with a lawyer on his or her staff. 
The current CAS rule does not require a full statement about every 
aspect of the constitutionality of a bill. It is quite easy to comply with. 
The sponsor needs to fill out a form with a citation to a provision of the 
Constitution. This can be extensive if desired, but need only be a single 
sentence or even less.  
The rule requires only that the sponsor cite ―the power or powers 
granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint 
resolution.‖73 It does not require an analysis of all possible 
constitutional problems the bill might create. 
The Constitution consists not only of power grants to Congress, but 
also of overlapping power grants to the President and the courts, 
affirmative limits on federal power over certain subjects, and structural 
features that can bar some types of legislation. There is a large universe 
of potential laws that would fall within one of the Constitution‘s power 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Id. at 1301 (―If constitutional deliberation is an individually supplied good, individual 
legislators do not internalize all of the benefits of constitutional deliberation, but do shoulder the 
costs. In such a system, constitutional deliberation will be underproduced.‖). See also 
BAMBERGER, supra note 51, at 150–51 (noting the importance of full and fair legislative 
hearings and lamenting that they don‘t always happen). 
 71. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1301 (―[A]ll members would benefit from a 
system that requires lawmakers to allocate some of their scarce time to the consideration of 
constitutional issues . . . .‖). 
 72. See Michael Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525, 530–35 (2009) (listing 
knowledge gaps that prevent scholars from evaluating Congress‘s constitutional performance). 
 73. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(c)(1) (1st Sess. 2011). 
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grants to Congress, but would violate some other provision or structural 
principle of the Constitution. For an obvious example, consider a law 
that bans interstate sales of religious books.
74
 This is a straightforward 
regulation of interstate commerce, a power that is granted to Congress.
75
 
But any such law would blatantly violate the First Amendment.
76
  
In the improbable event that a representative wanted to introduce 
such a bill, the CAS would fully comply with the rule by citing only the 
Commerce Clause, with no mention of the First Amendment. The 
Commerce Clause is ―the power . . . granted to Congress in the 
Constitution to enact the bill.‖77 The rule says nothing about citing 
relevant limits on congressional power or explaining why the bill is not 
barred by those limits. 
This aspect of the CAS rule creates some potential problems, which 
are discussed in Section III.D. But it has the advantage of making the ex 
ante task of constitutional analysis manageable. The sponsor is not 
expected to anticipate every possible constitutional objection to the bill 
under any circumstances that may arise. He or she is required only to 
address the question of Congress‘s initial authority to enact legislation 
on the bill‘s subject matter. 
It also prevents Representatives from wasting time on useless 
constitutional analyses. Most bills raise no serious constitutional 
questions, so searching for potential problems would be futile. But the 
underlying question of Congress‘s authority to enact a bill arises for 
every bill, not just a subset, and should be easily answered for most. 
3.  Increasing Capacity 
In addition, constitutional authority statements build Congress‘s 
interpretive capacity going forward. They force the production of 
preliminary information that can then be used in debates over whether 
to enact the bill. This explanation was part of the basis on which House 
leadership justified the CAS rule in an introductory memo:  
Just as a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget 
Office informs the debate on a proposed bill, a statement 
outlining the power under the Constitution that Congress 
has to enact a proposed bill will inform and provide the 
                                                                                                                     
 74. For similar examples, see, for example, Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the 
Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2011) (discussing a hypothetical law banning the 
interstate sale of news magazines). 
 75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (―The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .‖). 
 76. See id. amend. I. 
 77. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
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basis for debate. It also demonstrates to the American 
people that we in Congress understand that we have an 
obligation under our founding document to stay within the 
role established therein for the legislative branch.
78
 
Information-producing regulations are popular both outside and 
inside Congress. A paradigmatic example is the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to write 
environmental impact statements explaining the negative environmental 
effects of their proposals.
79
 NEPA does not raise any substantive 
barriers to an agency‘s continuing with those projects. A federal agency 
is free to carry out its program after thoroughly explaining exactly how 
environmentally catastrophic it will be.
80
 But many commentators have 
argued that NEPA is nonetheless effective because it increases the 
available information, allows outside groups to put pressure on the 
agency that is considering action, and encourages the agency to choose 
actions with fewer environmental consequences when possible.
81
 And 
unlike NEPA‘s onerous reporting requirements,82 the CAS rule does not 
create large costs or delay for Congress, since it is so easy to comply 
with. 
Examples of information-producing regulations within Congress‘s 
own deliberations include the Congressional Budget Office cost 
estimates mentioned in the House memo, the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995,
83
 and a recent proposal to require reports about the 
groups that will be harmed by certain types of legislation.
84
 These 
regulations cannot actually stop Congress from doing something 
harmful if it wants to, but they are designed to draw attention to the 
potential harms in the hope that the information will influence 
Congress‘s deliberative process. 
Constitutional authority statements serve the same type of function. 
An initial statement about the bill‘s constitutionality must be produced, 
                                                                                                                     
 78. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43. 
 79. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000). 
 80. But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 342–43 
(2004) (presenting the view of some scholars that NEPA was intended to have substantive as 
well as procedural requirements). 
 81. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 80, at 338–39 (describing the views of NEPA‘s 
―most ardent defenders‖). 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 339–43 (describing the heavy burdens that NEPA can place on 
agencies). 
 83. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 423, 109 Stat. 48, 53-
54 (1995) (requiring congressional committees to produce reports on unfunded mandates in bills 
that they approve). 
 84. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a 
Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2–3 (2009). 
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with the hope that any controversial statements will be debated as the 
bill moves through the legislative process. Additional constitutional 
issues that are not mentioned in the bill‘s CAS may also be noticed once 
attention is directed toward constitutional deliberation in general. 
Requiring a CAS at introduction, as compared with later in the 
legislative process, is beneficial because it identifies potential 
constitutional difficulties at the outset of deliberations, not at a late 
stage where they may be impossible to correct.
85
 
Constitutional authority statements lower the cost of constitutional 
deliberations during the legislative process because they provide an 
accessible starting point. Members and staff who might have neglected 
to think about constitutionality amid the clash of policy and interest 
group concerns are required to write a statement for their own bills, and 
see a statement in front of them for other bills. The added cost from the 
rule is small because writing the statements is a quick and easy task for 
the majority of bills. For the small number of bills that have less 
obvious constitutional authority, the increased time and deliberation is a 
highly desirable investment to avoid constitutional violations. 
II.  THE CONTENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS 
The CAS requirement is phrased in relatively vague terms, leaving 
lots of room for interpretation about how to write a constitutional 
authority statement. At the same time, it includes several hidden 
assumptions that have the potential to affect the content of CASs in 
unexpected and potentially harmful ways. The specific requirement of 
the CAS rule is: ―A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless 
the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a 
statement citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers 
granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint 
resolution.‖86  
A disagreement broke out over the meaning of the CAS rule on 
February 11, 2011, in a committee markup.
87
 The episode illustrates 
many of the substantive issues surrounding the interpretation of this 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1303 (―They need to know at an early stage 
when a proposal implicates a significant constitutional issue, and then they require analysis of 
the substance of the issue.‖). An even better rule would require a CAS at the beginning and at a 
later stage of the legislative process. See infra Section IV.B. 
 86. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(c)(1) (1st Sess. 2011). 
 87. No transcript for this part of the subcommittee markup hearing has been published, to 
my knowledge. A video of the session, lasting approximately forty minutes, can be viewed at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-and-pallone-urge-up 
ton-not-to-consider-hr-358-until-it-includes-citation-of-constitution. All references to the events 
of the subcommittee markup hearing are taken directly from this video. 
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rule. The Subcommittee on Health, which is part of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives, was beginning 
a session about H.R. 358, the Protect Life Act. The highly controversial 
bill, sponsored by Representative Joseph Pitts (R-Pa.), would restrict 
federal funds for abortion and allow federally funded hospitals to refuse 
to perform abortions.
88
 The bill was framed as an amendment to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), with the sponsor 
of the bill claiming that portions of the unamended PPACA are 
unconstitutional (presumably because they interfere with freedom of 
conscience). The constitutional authority statement for H.R. 358, in its 
entirety, reads as follows: ―The Protect Life Act would overturn an 
unconstitutional mandate regarding abortion in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act.‖89 
When the hearing started, Representative Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.) 
immediately raised a point of order under the CAS rule. He claimed that 
the bill was not properly before the subcommittee because its 
constitutional authority statement did not comply with the rule—and 
therefore that the bill should have been rejected at introduction for 
having an insufficient CAS. Throughout a forty-minute discussion, 
which became heated at times, Representative Weiner, Representative 
Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), and Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) 
made a number of complaints about the bill‘s CAS, while 
Representative Joe Barton (R-Tex.) and Representative Bob Latta (R-
Ohio) defended the sufficiency of the statement. Several questions were 
directed to the committee‘s counsel, to the House Parliamentarian, and 
to the House Rules Committee before the subcommittee chair ruled on 
the point of order. 
The discussion proceeded in a rather confused and imprecise way, 
but several separate threads can be identified:  
First, Representative Weiner objected that the CAS for H.R. 358 did 
not cite a specific section of the Constitution. Representative Waxman 
later joined this argument, reading the CASs for several other bills 
aloud and noting that they all reference specific sections or clauses of 
the Constitution by number (for example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) 
or by clause name (for example, the Commerce Clause). The CAS for 
H.R. 358, by contrast, does not mention or even allude to any specific 
section. 
Second, Representative Weiner argued that to repeal a prior statute, a 
representative has to say something more than ―the prior statute is 
unconstitutional.‖ She has to cite some provision of the Constitution 
                                                                                                                     
 88. H.R. 358, 112th Cong. § 2(b)-(c) (1st Sess. 2011). 
 89. 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for 
H.R. 358 introduced by Representative Pitts). 
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that provides Congress with the power to enact the new statute, not just 
to repeal the prior one. Otherwise, the CAS rule would allow a 
representative to enact any bill simply by saying ―I believe this bill is 
constitutional.‖ Representative Latta attempted to directly rebut this 
point, arguing that it is always constitutional to repeal an 
unconstitutional statute, and that no other statement of authority is 
necessary once the prior statute is claimed to be unconstitutional. 
Third, Representative Pallone suggested that the reason the sponsor 
of H.R. 358 did not cite specific constitutional authority is because it 
would be impossible to do so—the bill is substantively unconstitutional 
because it infringes a woman‘s right to privacy. Representative Pallone 
specifically referenced Roe v. Wade
90
 as recognizing this right. 
Fourth, Representative Barton tried to provide additional authority 
for H.R. 358 that was not cited in the bill‘s CAS. He pointed to Article 
I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states, ―All legislative powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,‖ as substantive 
authority for Congress to amend any prior statute. 
Fifth, Representative Barton argued that all of the issues raised by 
Reps. Weiner and Pallone were irrelevant to the point of order under 
debate. The only requirement of the rule, he claimed, is that a CAS 
paper be filed with something written on it. The substantive content of 
the CAS is an important subject of debate in the committee, but 
insufficient content does not mean that the bill was not properly 
introduced in the first place. The fact that H.R. 358 had a CAS that 
Representative Weiner could read aloud meant that it was in compliance 
with the rule. 
Ultimately, this fifth and final point prevailed. The Chair of the 
Subcommittee, acting on advice from the Parliamentarian and the Rules 
Committee, ruled that a point of order cannot be used to object that the 
content of a CAS is incorrect or insufficient. The fact that the CAS 
document was filed with something written on it is enough to fulfill the 
requirement in the House Rules.  
A.  Policing CAS Content 
The decision not to enforce specific requirements about the content 
of a CAS is frustrating, but it does not destroy the rule‘s usefulness. In 
the words of Representative Waxman, ―You could say, 
                                                                                                                     
 90. 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 358); See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing, for the first time, a woman‘s constitutional right to 
abortion and locating that right in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), 
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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‗Aboogaboogaboogabooga!‘ and that‘s enough to justify the 
constitutionality of the proposal.‖91 If the only requirement is that the 
sponsor write some random words on the form, unmotivated sponsors 
can flout the requirement without a second thought. 
The subcommittee chair‘s decision is consistent with the text of the 
rule, though the text is certainly open to a different interpretation as 
well. The rule does not lend itself to precise line-drawing, but some 
minimum limits of what sorts of things qualify as ―powers granted to 
Congress in the Constitution‖ and ―as specifically as practicable‖ could 
be formulated and enforced. 
The decision is also consistent with the initial explanation by the 
House Rules Committee of how the CAS requirement would work. The 
introductory memo explaining the new requirement made it clear that 
the clerk of the House will not accept a bill with a blank CAS form, but 
he does not check to see whether the constitutional authority is accurate 
or complete.
92
 The memo stated that ―the adequacy and accuracy of the 
citation of constitutional authority is a matter for debate in the 
committees and in the House,‖ not something that would cause the bill 
to be rejected on procedural grounds.
93
 
But even without strict procedural enforcement, CASs still serve two 
very important functions. First, even an incomplete CAS can spark 
debate about substantive constitutional issues, even ones that are not 
mentioned in the CAS at all. The shift in the subcommittee debate to the 
substantive constitutionality of abortion rights, abortion restrictions, and 
the health insurance mandate demonstrates that attention to one 
constitutional issue can spill over to give attention to others. Second, 
Representatives can encourage each other to take the rule seriously 
despite the lack of hard consequences for ignoring it. Representative 
Weiner‘s objection to the CAS for H.R. 358 was partially intended to 
kill the bill, but it was also intended to shame the Republicans for 
evading a rule they themselves had created. And as the House Rules 
Memo pointed out, an inadequate or incorrect CAS can provide a reason 
to vote against a bill. To the extent Representatives believe the CAS 
requirement is a helpful legislative tool, they will follow the spirit of the 
requirement and encourage their colleagues to do so as well. 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Ben Weyl, Parties Spar over Interpretation of „Constitutional Authority‟ Rule, CQ 
TODAY, Feb. 15, 2011. 
 92. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43 (―Under the rule, the clerk will not accept 
the bill [if it does not have a CAS] and it will be returned to the sponsor.‖). 
 93. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43. 
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B.  Specificity 
One of Representative Weiner‘s objections, though not his core 
objection, to the CAS for H.R. 358 was that it was not specific enough. 
Reading the CAS, he could not identify what constitutional power the 
bill‘s sponsor meant to rely on. The proper level of specificity in a CAS 
is unclear under the rule, but at a minimum, it should allow other 
members of Congress to clearly understand the claim of congressional 
power that is being made. 
The rule asks Representatives to cite the constitutional authority for 
a bill ―as specifically as practicable.‖ Some CASs take this requirement 
very seriously, citing one or more individual clauses of the Constitution 
that authorize particular powers of Congress, such as the power to 
borrow money
94
 or the power to grant patents and copyrights.
95
 A few 
divide the provisions of the bill into different groups and identify the 
constitutional authority for each category.
96
 
A handful of CASs engage in a thorough and highly detailed 
explanation of the constitutional ramifications of the proposed 
legislation. For example, the CAS for H.R. 922 includes several 
paragraphs of discussion about the Federalist Papers and Supreme Court 
doctrine as well as three particular clauses of the Constitution.
97
 
Others are much less specific. In my database of all 1,709 signing 
statements introduced from January through April 2011, 142 statements 
cite Article I, Section 8 without further specificity. This section of the 
Constitution contains most of the powers granted to Congress, and these 
142 CASs do not provide any further information about which of the 
eighteen clauses within Article I, Section 8 authorizes the bill.  
Even worse, forty-four CASs cite simply Article I of the 
Constitution with no further specificity, and an additional seven cite 
Article I, Section 1, the section that vests Congress with legislative 
power. This is hard to understand as anything other than a protest 
against the rule, and indeed, all but two of these fifty-one CASs citing 
Article I or Article I, Section 1 were introduced by Democrats.
98
 
Good-faith compliance with the CAS rule should in most cases mean 
citing at least one specific power-granting clause of the Constitution, or 
a short section that is not normally divided into clauses. The goal of the 
                                                                                                                     
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 95. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 96. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H434 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 397 introduced by Representative Herger). 
 97. See 157 Cong. Rec. H1576 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 922 introduced by Representative Gosar). 
 98. By contrast, significant numbers of both Republicans and Democrats cited Article I, 
Section 8. 
26
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/4
2013] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS IN CONGRESS 199 
 
rule is for Congress to ensure that it is passing only legislation that falls 
within its enumerated powers. That goal is not served by a general wave 
of the hand, saying that it must be in Article I, Section 8 somewhere. 
Certain broadly worded clauses of the Constitution raise a more 
difficult question. The Commerce Clause,
99
 the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,
100
 and the General Welfare Clause
101
 have all been recognized 
as allowing Congress significant leeway to regulate in areas not 
specifically mentioned by the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, these are 
popular clauses to cite in a CAS, particularly when the subject of the 
bill is not covered by any of the more specific constitutional power 
grants.
102
  
Some critics might say that citing these very general, open-ended 
clauses defeats the purpose of the rule. If Congress can claim that 
basically anything is justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it 
is not really being specific about its constitutional powers. 
Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey, an early proponent of 
constitutional authority statements, has proposed banning citation to 
clauses like these.
103
  
Yet, there is no denying that these broadly worded clauses do grant 
powers to Congress—lots of powers. Requiring Congress to identify the 
part of the Constitution that allows them to enact a bill, and then 
forbidding them to cite particular parts of the Constitution in response to 
the question, is ridiculous. If taken seriously, it would be almost 
equivalent to striking those clauses from the Constitution.  
The concern behind Representative Garrett‘s proposal is real, 
however. Citing to general clauses reduces the impact of the rule. A 
representative could justify everything with reference to the General 
Welfare Clause and never engage in any more specific constitutional 
analysis about the particular subjects of the legislation he or she 
introduces. 
                                                                                                                     
 99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 100. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 101. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 102. In my January through April 2011 database, the Commerce Clause was cited alone 
278 times, the Necessary and Proper Clause was cited alone 128 times, and the General Welfare 
Clause was cited alone 260 times. These clauses were also cited many times in combination 
with another clause, raising the overall specificity of the CAS. 
 103. See H.R. Res. 1754, 111th Cong. (2010); David A. Fahrenthold, Congress Finds, and 
Lists, Meaning in Constitution, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2011, available at http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/politics/congress-finds-and-lists-meaning-in-constitution/2011/09/14/gIQA1VQ 
zXK_print.html (―[Representative] Garrett had pressed for a more restrictive version of the rule, 
which would ban members from citing the ‗necessary and proper‘ and ‗general welfare‘ 
clauses.‖).  
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Responsible legislators can deal with this problem in a much less 
drastic way, fortunately. CASs that cite these broad clauses should 
include a brief explanation why the bill‘s subject falls within the cited 
clause. This is not particularly important for CASs that cite specific 
clauses—it is obvious, for example, why a bill making changes to patent 
law is justified under the Patent Clause.
104
 But the question of whether a 
bill setting physical education requirements for public schools is 
authorized by the clause that says, ―The Congress shall have Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States‖?105 That is a more difficult question. 
An explanation can make the sponsor‘s reasoning much clearer. For 
example, the CAS for H.R. 1201 cites the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
and then explains, ―This [power] includes the ability to hire staff to 
assist in the execution of the foregoing powers and to define the salaries 
and benefits of those staff.‖ 
C.  Textual vs. Structural Constitutional Authority 
The crux of Representative Weiner‘s objection, though, was not that 
the CAS for H.R. 358 was too vague. It was that H.R. 358 did not 
attempt to cite a textual provision of the Constitution at all. It does not 
refer to anything ―in the Constitution.‖ It only states that the bill would 
repeal a prior statute, and that the prior statute is unconstitutional. No 
part of the Constitution, Representative Weiner correctly pointed out, 
explicitly grants Congress the power to repeal unconstitutional statutes. 
This objection brings to light a crucial question about the CAS rule. 
Does ―citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted 
to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill‖ mean that the bill‘s 
sponsor must point to an explicit, textual power grant in the 
Constitution? 
Not all powers granted by the Constitution are apparent from the text 
alone. Even the most ardent textualist understands that some 
governmental powers arise out of the structure of the Constitution, 
without any textual authority that is directly on point.
106
  
                                                                                                                     
 104. The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, a major piece of patent legislation that was 
enacted during the 112th Congress, cites the Patent Clause in its constitutional authority 
statement. See Constitutional Authority Statement, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (introduced by 
Representative Smith on Mar. 30, 2011) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 105. See Constitutional Authority Statement, H.R. 422, 112th Cong. (introduced by 
Representative Baca on Jan. 25, 2011) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
 106. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
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One example is the President‘s power to remove executive 
officers.
107
 The Constitution is very specific  how to appoint executive 
officers,
108
 but does not make any mention of removing them except by 
impeachment.
109
 Surely there must be some way to remove executive 
officers who are not doing a good job but have not committed an 
impeachable offense. After a near-crippling series of inter-branch 
disputes about who can exercise this power (not about whether it can be 
exercised at all), the Supreme Court reasoned from structural principles 
that the President can generally remove executive officers unless 
Congress gives them special protection in certain circumstances.
110
 
Congress, too, may have constitutional powers that are rooted more 
in structure than in text. The sponsor of H.R. 358 seems to allude to one 
of these, though he does not state it explicitly. The CAS for the bill can 
reasonably be read as calling on a structural power of Congress to 
repeal unconstitutional statutes. It would seem strange to say that this 
power does not exist at all. If Congress passes an unconstitutional 
statute, it intuitively seems that Congress should be able to undo its own 
mistake. It should not have to wait for a Presidential veto, an executive 
decision not to enforce the statute, or a judicial ruling of 
unconstitutionality. Congress should be able to just repeal the statute. 
For most repeals, there may be textual provisions that also justify the 
repeal bill. But in some cases—particularly those where the 
unconstitutionality arises from Congress exceeding its enumerated 
powers, rather than from violating a constitutional limit—there may be 
nothing other than the structural argument to justify the repeal bill. 
I do not think the CAS rule forbids citation to structural powers. 
Despite not being explicit in the text, these powers are nonetheless truly 
in the Constitution. To serve the specificity requirement, a sponsor 
relying on a structural power should make it clear that the power is 
structural, and perhaps provide a brief explanation of the structural 
concerns that lead to the recognition of this power. Thus, my view is 
that the CAS for H.R. 358 could have been more clearly written, but 
that it fundamentally does comply with the rule because it refers to a 
legitimate structural power of Congress. 
                                                                                                                     
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (explaining the importance of structural reasoning in 
constitutional law). 
 107. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 108. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 109. See id. art. II, § 4 (―The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.‖). 
 110. See Humphrey‘s Ex‘r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
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D.  Powers vs. Limits, Revisited 
Up to this point, we have been assuming that the rule‘s focus on the 
powers of Congress means that a CAS need not address external limits 
that the Constitution places on any exercise of congressional power. 
While this interpretation of the rule has benefits, primarily in ease of 
compliance, it also has a significant drawback. It may encourage 
Congress to interpret its own powers even more broadly than it already 
does. 
The goal of the CAS rule was to focus Congress‘s attention on its 
enumerated powers to prevent it from exceeding those powers. It was 
created as a response to what Republicans saw as congressional 
overreach under Democratic leadership. The result, however, is a large 
amount of attention to the Constitution‘s power grants with almost no 
attention to its limits on congressional power (or to limits on federal 
power in general). This could lead to Congress adopting an even more 
expansive view of its own powers than previously. Just as the Executive 
Branch has a tendency to interpret executive powers broadly, Congress 
is likely to interpret its own legislative powers broadly.
111
 Every time a 
CAS cites the Commerce Clause as authority to enact a statute having 
limited effects on interstate commerce, it bolsters the broad 
interpretation of that clause. 
One way to avoid this outcome is to require attention to 
constitutional limits. It‘s even possible to read the current CAS rule 
broadly to require a full discussion of constitutionality. One could argue 
that something is not within ―the power or powers granted to Congress 
in the Constitution‖ if some other part of the Constitution prevents 
Congress from doing that thing.  
But if the House of Representatives had intended to require a full 
statement of the constitutionality of each bill, it would most likely have 
used more natural language for that requirement, such as asking the 
sponsor to provide a ―statement explaining why the bill is constitutional, 
with citations to specific constitutional provisions‖ or used something 
akin to the term coined by Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, a 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Congress also tends to adopt a broad view of its own oversight powers, particularly 
with respect to the administrative agencies. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, 
It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 (Autumn 1993) (noting that Congress 
continues to enact statutes with legislative veto provisions even after such procedures were held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Chadha); see, e.g., Constitutional Authority 
Statement, H.R. 1104, 112th Cong. (introduced by Representative Stutzman on Mar. 15, 2011) 
(expressing a broad view of Congress‘s ―constitutionally prescribed rule to direct the 
Environmental Protection Agency, a body which regulates interstate commerce under the 
auspices of Congress‖). 
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―constitutional impact statement.‖112 Instead, the House chose to focus 
Representatives‘ attention on the power to enact. 
From the outset of adopting the rule, it has been explained as 
requiring citation to powers, not limits. The House Rules Memo states 
that a CAS should include ―the Member‘s name and signature, the title 
of the measure it accompanies, and a citation to the power or powers 
granted in the Constitution to enact the bill.‖113 Nothing is said about 
citing other relevant portions of the Constitution aside from power 
grants.
114
 All but one of the examples given in the memo also follow 
this format, citing only power grants, not other constitutional 
provisions.
115
 
Actual CASs in the 112th Congress have overwhelmingly tended to 
follow the example of the memo and cite only power grants, not 
limiting clauses. The majority of CASs cite only a single power-
granting clause of the Constitution. Many cite a combination of power-
granting clauses, for example a specific provision combined with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause or several of the military clauses
116
 
together. Mentions of individual rights are quite scarce. In my CAS 
database of 1,709 bills and resolutions, the First Amendment appears 
only six times, the Second Amendment also appears six times, the 
Fourth Amendment appears only three times, and sections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (other than the explicit power grant in Section 
Five) appear only nineteen times.
117
 Representatives are clearly 
focusing on power grants, not individual rights or other limits on power, 
when they write CASs. 
Perhaps the deliberation-forcing aspect of CASs will counteract the 
initial focus on powers alone. If limits that are overlooked in a CAS are 
nonetheless discussed in the committee rooms and on the floor of the 
House, this concern would be significantly lessened. However, if the 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1310. 
 113. Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43.  
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. (presenting five sample CASs which cite (1) ―the power of Congress to make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces‖ (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
14); (2) the grant of congressional power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment; (3) the 
Commerce Clause; (4) the General Welfare Clause and the Sixteenth Amendment (granting 
Congress the power to enact an income tax); and (5) a structural power to repeal federal laws by 
―return[ing] power to the States and to the people, in accordance with Amendment X of the 
United States Constitution.‖). The last example, citing the Tenth Amendment, is somewhat 
different from the others in that the Tenth Amendment is a limit on federal power, not a power 
grant to Congress. However, the memo uses it as textual support for an affirmative structural 
power of Congress to repeal existing law (presumably including laws that are unconstitutional). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–16. 
 117. Data on file with author. 
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focus on powers alone causes Congress to continually ignore its limits, 
requiring consideration of limits as well as powers might be 
appropriate.
118
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Constitutional authority statements are published, publicly available, 
and attached to a large percentage of bills that become law, if not all of 
them.
119
 Some of these laws will eventually be challenged as being 
unconstitutional. When that happens, how will courts treat the 
constitutional authority statements? This Part explains why courts 
should not, and most likely will not, treat them as binding on the court‘s 
decisions.  
A.  Constitutional Authority Statements as Legislative History 
Congress‘s basic message in a CAS is that the bill under 
consideration will be constitutional if enacted into law. How should the 
courts treat this legislative determination? 
As currently structured, CASs are a form of legislative history,
120
 
and a very weak form at that. Several factors can make items of 
legislative history more authoritative, but CASs exhibit few of these. 
1.  Authoritativeness: Whom Does it Speak For? 
CASs are not law. They are not included in the text of the bill, and 
they are not enacted by Congress through the Article I, Section 7 
process. Thus, they cannot be binding on courts. Judges might choose to 
rely to some extent on a CAS for interpretive purposes, or they might 
find themselves in agreement with a CAS in a particular case, but they 
are not bound by the CAS that was attached to the bill. CASs are just 
another form of legislative history. 
Courts weight different types of legislative history differently.. In 
general, a piece of legislative history is most authoritative if it speaks 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See infra Subsection V.A.2. 
 119. A CAS is mandatory for all bills that originate in the House of Representatives. Bills 
that originate in the Senate may or may not be assigned a CAS when they are introduced in the 
House of Representatives, at the discretion of the chair of the committee of jurisdiction over the 
bill in the House. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (adopting rules for the 112th 
Congress, including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement). 
 120. A memo prepared by the House Rules Committee to instruct Members about how to 
comply with the new CAS requirement acknowledges that the statements will be legislative 
history. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43 (―To the extent that a court looks at the 
legislative history of an Act, the Constitutional Authority Statement would be part of that 
history. However, the courts have made clear that they will not uphold an unconstitutional law 
simply on the basis that Congress thinks that the law is constitutional.‖). 
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/4
2013] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS IN CONGRESS 205 
 
for a large portion of Congress. A committee report carries more weight 
than a floor statement in part because the report is approved by a 
majority of the committee while a floor statement is the remark of a 
single person.
121
 A conference committee report also carries great 
weight because it is a document written by members of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate together, providing a view of at least 
some of the members of both houses.
122
 
A constitutional authority statement is the statement of a single 
member of Congress. The sponsor of a bill writes the CAS at the time 
the bill is introduced. Perhaps every member of Congress might agree 
with the CAS, but it would be difficult for a judge to determine that. It 
is equally possible that everyone disagreed with the CAS but had no 
way of changing it.
123
 A judge might turn to committee reports or floor 
debate to look for wider approval or disapproval of the CAS. If he does 
so, however, the judicial reliance is on the other statements as much as 
or more than on the CAS itself. 
The CAS might be given slightly more authority by courts than the 
average floor statement, on the grounds that it is a statement by the 
sponsor of the bill. Sponsor statements are sometimes treated as more 
authoritative than statements of other supporters or of opponents to the 
bill.
124
 A CAS written by the sponsor of a bill at the time of its 
introduction might be thought to be a particularly well-considered and 
researched statement, thus gaining more authority in the eyes of a court. 
Even so, the CAS is a statement of a single member of the House of 
Representatives, one among the hundreds in that house and entirely 
unrepresentative of the views of the Senate. A CAS created in the way 
the House of Representatives currently requires them to be created is a 
very weak form of legislative history. 
2.  Usefulness: Does the CAS Make Legal Arguments? 
Most CASs are fairly straightforward legal statements, of the type 
that would be recognized and understood by lawyers and judges. But a 
few are something quite different. This is best illustrated by example. 
                                                                                                                     
 121. There are many additional reasons that committee reports are seen as more 
authoritative, including the focused attention of the committee members on the bill, expertise, 
and thorough explication of the issues. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 162 (2008) (explaining why committee reports are generally seen as a more 
persuasive form of legislative history). 
 122. See id. at 162 (placing conference committee reports at the top of the legislative 
history persuasiveness hierarchy). 
 123. See infra Section V.A. 
 124. See JELLUM, supra note 121, at 163–64 (summarizing arguments for and against 
treating a sponsor or drafter‘s statement more favorably than the statements of others). 
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H.R. 1420, introduced by Representative Jesse Jackson Jr., is the 
Civil War Sesquicentennial Commission Act.
125
 The bill would direct 
the Secretary of Interior to appoint a ―Civil War Sesquicentennial 
Commemoration Commission‖126 composed of twenty-five members, 
including several specified government officials and a number of 
private citizens with relevant expertise.
127
 The commission would ―plan, 
develop, and carry out programs and activities appropriate to 
commemorate the sesquicentennial of the Civil War,‖128 and undertake 
various similar educational and celebratory activities.
129
 The bill also 
deals with various financial matters regarding the Commission, 
including a general appropriation to carry out the Act,
130
 travel expenses 
for official business,
131
 and staff.
132
 
A lawyer would look at this bill and immediately point out several 
relevant clauses of the Constitution: the Appointments Clause for 
appointing officers,
133
 the General Welfare Clause for spending money 
on the project,
134
 perhaps the clause that requires all appropriations to 
be made by law.
135
 It would be prudent to throw in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause
136
 as well, because not all of the Commission‘s functions 
are squarely within Congress‘s enumerated powers. One might also note 
a potential Incompatibility Clause
137
 problem because the bill requires 
two Senators and two Representatives to be appointed to the 
Commission, but these types of ceremonial offices are rarely 
challenged. 
Representative Jackson did not cite any of these clauses when he 
introduced the bill.
 
Instead, he cited the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
138
 
                                                                                                                     
 125. H.R. 1420, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011). 
 126. Id. § 3. 
 127. Id. § 4. 
 128. Id. § 6. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 10. 
 131. Id. § 9(b). 
 132. Id. § 9(c). 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 134. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;‖). 
 135. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖). 
 136. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 137. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (―No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he 
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which 
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased [sic] during such 
time . . . .‖). 
 138. 157 Cong. Rec. H2535 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
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The Civil War Amendments are relevant to H.R. 1420 only in spirit, 
not in substance. The bill‘s provisions have nothing to do with 
preventing involuntary servitude;
139
 with protecting the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees of privileges and immunities, due process, or 
equal protection;
140
 or with guaranteeing the right to vote.
141
 
But Representative Jackson‘s CAS nonetheless has an underlying 
appeal to it. The purpose of the bill is to remind the American public of 
how the Civil War Amendments came about and why they are 
important, and to commemorate the struggle that led to their creation. 
The amendments are relevant to the bill symbolically. It seems crass to 
say that Representative Jackson should not have cited them because 
they are not substantively relevant to the content of his bill. Perhaps it 
would be more fair to say that he should have cited them along with the 
legally relevant clauses, however. 
Representative Jackson‘s signing statement exemplifies a category 
of aspirational signing statements.
142
 While they are important for 
expressing the values and purposes behind legislative proposals, they 
are no help in defending a statute against constitutional challenges. The 
content of H.R. 1420 is constitutionally unobjectionable, so this 
particular CAS does not matter much. But one could imagine a similar 
CAS for a blatantly unconstitutional law (for example, banning all 
books containing racial slurs), or for a highly questionable law (for 
example, exempting minorities from paying income taxes). In those 
cases, an aspirational CAS would have no weight at all in court. 
Congress‘s statements about the Constitution can legitimately be of a 
different style than judicial statements about the Constitution.
143
 Judges 
speak about the Constitution in the course of deciding particular cases 
and controversies.
144
 The question for a judge is whether a particular 
                                                                                                                     
for H.R. 1420 introduced by Representative Jackson). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 140. Id. amend. XIV. 
 141. Id. amend. XV. 
 142. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H2571 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 1457 introduced by Representative Luetkemeyer) (citing the religious 
protections in the First Amendment as authority for a bill to review Jewish WWI veterans for 
Medal of Honor awards); see, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H1843 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2011) 
(Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 1093 introduced by Representative King) (citing 
the Second Amendment as authority for a bill making detailed changes to the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives). 
 143. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1319 (―Congressional staff should be 
encouraged to analyze any judicial advice rigorously through the legislative lens, remembering 
that the legalistic approach of judges may not be as appropriate for Congress.‖); see also Brest, 
supra note 39 (arguing that Members of Congress should apply stricter tests of constitutionality 
than those used by courts). 
 144. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
35
Volokh: Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
208 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
piece of legislation, or a particular application of a law, or a particular 
executive action, violates the Constitution.
145
 This has a tendency to 
result in narrow, legalistic holdings about particular discrete issues, 
though of course the courts occasionally speak more broadly about 
constitutional values or structure.  
Congress attempts a much larger task. Yes, Congress should analyze 
whether each particular bill is within its powers and whether the bill 
violates an express prohibition in the Constitution. But Congress also 
creates legislation that changes the structure of government and of 
society. It creates legislation that rewards certain behavior and punishes 
other behavior. In doing so, Congress acts not only on the express 
power grants and limits in the Constitution, but also on the values that 
give it life.
146
 When Representative Jackson cited the Civil War 
Amendments in his CAS, he did not mean that those clauses formally 
provided power grants for Congress to enact the legislation. He meant 
that the values of equality and freedom expressed in those amendments 
were what inspired his bill. 
Aspirational statements about the Constitution are appropriate for 
Congress. They are not, however, helpful to the courts. If Congress 
intends to influence judicial interpretation with CASs, it will need to use 
styles of argument that the courts can engage with. But if Congress 
primarily intends CASs to be a tool for its own deliberations, 
aspirational statements are appropriate and even important. 
3.  Thoroughness: Does the CAS Address the Problem Presented to the 
Courts? 
When a statute is challenged, the constitutional question presented to 
the court might not be addressed at all in the constitutional authority 
statement for that statute. Some CASs are quite thorough, but most cite 
only a single point of authority for the statute.
147
 As discussed above,
148
 
the question of underlying constitutional authority may not answer all 
possible constitutional questions about a bill. 
A particular CAS might correctly cite authority to pass a bill from 
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, while failing 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See Tulis, supra note 65, at 519 (―For a court, anything within a wide ambit of 
constitutionally permissible actions is legitimate, but legislators might responsibly oppose 
legislation on the ground that it did not advance constitutional purposes enough or at all.‖). 
 146. Id. at 519 (―Whether a policy or a body of policies advances the constitutional 
aspirations of a people is a legitimate ground for a legislative decision, even though it would not 
be appropriate for a judicial decision.‖). 
 147. In January through April of 2011, around two-thirds of CASs cited only a single 
clause of the Constitution. 
 148. See supra Subsection II.B.2 and Section III.D. 
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to mention due process or First Amendment issues that arguably prevent 
the bill from being applied in certain ways. Or the CAS might make no 
mention of the Appointments Clause in a bill that sets up a novel 
method for appointing officers, citing authority only for the basic 
subject of the bill rather than for each provision. While the Supreme 
Court does sometimes entertain enumerated powers challenges,
149
 
questions about less-central aspects of a bill are far more common.
150
 
Thus, in many cases, a bill‘s CAS will not even be relevant to the 
constitutional challenge brought against it. 
Even where a CAS is relevant to the question presented to a court, it 
is likely to provide little information. A lawsuit might challenge the 
underlying content of a bill, such as by arguing that it exceeds 
Congress‘s powers under the Commerce Clause, or a bill with a more 
extensive CAS may be challenged on grounds mentioned in the CAS. 
But a CAS is not a legal brief. It usually provides only a bare statement 
that certain clauses of the Constitution provide authority. CASs with 
lengthy explanations of why or how the clause is relevant, or even any 
explanation at all, are few and far between. 
Presented with a CAS alone, a court will essentially have the choice 
to defer to Congress or ignore the statement. The CAS may assert, for 
example, that the bill under consideration is authorized by the 
Commerce Clause and does not violate the First Amendment. It 
provides no reasoning, no rebuttal of arguments to the contrary, and no 
explanation. The conclusion is simply stated. And recall, this statement 
is not one explicitly affirmed by Congress as a whole, but by an 
individual member of the House of Representatives. For the court, it is 
no choice at all. It cannot defer to the CAS alone without engaging in 
further analysis. 
Of course, the court might look to additional legislative history to 
seek out a more thorough explanation of the CAS and to find agreement 
by a larger number of members. But this is not reliance on the CAS, it is 
reliance on legislative history more broadly. 
This is not meant to be an indictment of CASs. The fact is that they 
serve a different purpose. A CAS, as currently designed, is not intended 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (reviewing the constitutionality of the 
Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act under the 
Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause). 
 150. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (reviewing a law 
regulating interstate commerce solely for Appointments Clause violations); Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (reviewing a law regulating interstate commerce solely for First 
Amendment violations). Both of these statutes were passed before constitutional authority 
statements were required in the House of Representatives. 
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to be an authoritative statement of Congress. It is not meant to be a 
guide to judicial interpretation. It is meant to be a tool for Congress 
itself to use. When a bill is introduced and sent to committee, the CAS 
serves as a starting point for discussion about the constitutionality of the 
bill. It is meant to trigger further debate and analysis when necessary, 
not to be the end of the discussion. Courts should be able to recognize 
this and treat CASs accordingly. 
B.  Constitutional Estoppel 
In a small number of cases, a problem that might be called 
―constitutional estoppel‖ could arise. When a statute is challenged for 
lack of underlying congressional authority to enact it, and the CAS 
addresses one possible source of congressional authority but not 
another, the petitioners might argue that the law cannot be defended on 
the second ground because Congress did not cite it. The question is, 
should the courts be limited to the one or more clauses cited by 
Congress when assessing the statute‘s constitutionality? 
This type of controversy has arisen recently, with a statute that does 
not include a formal constitutional authority statement. The Affordable 
Care Act
151
 that was enacted during the 111th Congress was passed 
before the House rules required CASs. Nonetheless, the bill text itself 
included a statement about the constitutionality of the bill, citing a 
Supreme Court case that held insurance to be a form of interstate 
commerce.
152
 Supporters repeatedly justified the mandate as a 
regulation of interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of 
the Constitution,
153
 against the fervent objections of opponents who 
claimed the Commerce Clause could not reach an individual‘s decision 
to not purchase insurance. These same supporters, including President 
Barack Obama,
154
 vigorously denied that the fines for not purchasing 
individual insurance were a tax, which would have been justified by 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.
155
 When the law was 
challenged in court and the argument that it violates the Commerce 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 152. See Affordable Care Act § 1501(A)(3) (citing United States v. Se. Underwriters 
Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)). 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (―The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes‖). 
 154. See, e.g., Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS, Sept. 20, 
2009, transcript of interview of Pres. Obama, available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/ (―[F]or us to say that you‘ve got to take a responsibility to 
get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase.‖). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises‖). 
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Clause was seen to be stronger than supporters initially thought, lawyers 
began defending it as an exercise of Congress‘s taxing power.156 The 
Supreme Court eventually upheld the statue on the grounds that it is a 
valid exercise of Congress‘s power to tax.157 
The existence of constitutional authority statements could make this 
situation occur more frequently. In the past, Congress has not explicitly 
stated a constitutional justification when enacting most statutes. After 
the rule change, however, many statutes come with such a statement.
158
 
Should these statements be seen as binding, in the sense that if a statute 
cites improper constitutional authority, it is invalid regardless of 
whether another part of the Constitution would justify it? 
A few members of Congress have shown concern about this 
possibility, and have attempted to address it in the CASs themselves. 
This can be done in several ways.  
One simple way is to make the CAS as broad as possible, for 
instance by citing Article I of the Constitution without any further 
specificity,
159
 or by citing the entirety of Article I, Section 8, which 
contains most of the individual power grants to Congress.
160
 Of course, 
this approach reduces the CASs usefulness to Congress as a deliberative 
tool, as discussed above.
161
 
A similar tactic, but one which requires more individual attention to 
the particulars of the bill in question, is to cite numerous clauses of the 
Constitution for the same bill. So, for example, one short bill (only 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See, e.g., Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the 
individual mandate exceeds Congress‘s Commerce Clause power and that it is not a tax) 
vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 11-420, 2012 WL 2470098 (June 29, 2012); 
see also Ben Wilterdink, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate: Is It a Tax or Not a Tax?, 
WASH. EXAMINER, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/the-individual-
health-insurance-mandate-is-it-a-tax-or-not-a-tax/article/140265 (collecting conflicting government 
statements about whether the mandate is a tax or not). 
 157. Nat. Fed. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–2601 (2012).  
 158. Statutes that originate in the Senate may or may not acquire a CAS when introduced 
in the House of Representatives. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the 
112th Congress, including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement). 
 159. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H397 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 377 introduced by Representative Lee) (―The power granted to Congress 
under Article I of the United States Constitution and its subsequent amendments, and further 
clarified and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.‖). 
 160. Citations to Article I, Section 8 without further elaboration in CASs are too numerous 
to list. A representative example is 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) 
(Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 372 introduced by Representative Buchanan) 
(―The constitutional authority on which this legislation rests is the power of Congress 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.‖). 
 161. See supra Section II.B. 
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about a page of text) has a CAS that cites nine separate clauses of the 
Constitution.
162
 
Several legislators have included various forms of savings clauses in 
CASs. One states, ―The authority to enact this bill is derived from, but 
may not be limited to, Article I, Section 8.‖163 Others cite one or more 
clauses and then append the disclaimer, ―The specific Constitutional 
Authority cited here is not intended and should not be construed to be 
exclusive of any other general or specific Constitutional Authority that 
is otherwise applicable.‖164 
These are statements that clearly have judicial interpretation in mind. 
The legislators are citing the constitutional authority they believe to be 
appropriate, but stating the possibility that there might be other sources 
of constitutional authority as well.  
Another type of statement is even more intriguing. One bill‘s CAS 
cites some constitutional authority and then announces: ―Further, this 
statement of constitutional authority is made for the sole purpose of 
compliance with clause 7 of Rule XII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives and shall have no bearing on judicial review of the 
accompanying bill.‖165 This statement is not a hedge, but is an explicit 
instruction to courts that they should not use this piece of legislative 
history in further interpretation. Will the courts honor this statement? It 
remains to be seen. Statutory instructions of interpretive methodology 
are controversial enough;
166
 legislative history instructions of 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See 157 Cong. Rec. H2267 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 1323 introduced by Representative Bartlett) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; 
id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12, 13; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3). 
 163. 157 Cong. Rec. H1456 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
for H.R. 862 introduced by Representative Murphy) The phrase ―may not be limited to‖ can be 
read in two different ways. Representative Murphy may have been tentatively suggesting that 
other clauses of the Constitution might also authorize the bill he was introducing, or he may 
have been ordering the courts that they are not permitted to limit Congress‘s justification for the 
bill to the section he cited. 
 164. 157 Cong. Rec. H1455 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement 
for H.R. 845 introduced by Representative Rehberg); 157 Cong. Rec. H1455 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 846 introduced by Representative 
Labrador).  
 165. 157 Cong. Rec. H552 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for 
H.R. 559 introduced by Representative Richmond) 
 166. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory 
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003) (arguing 
that legislated statutory interpretation rules cannot bind future interpreters); Abbe R. Gluck, The 
States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (examining legislated statutory 
interpretation rules in the states); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (advocating a federal system of legislated 
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interpretive methodology are likely to be either ignored or used only 
strategically. 
IV.  TOWARD A STRONGER CAS? 
The primary criticism of adopting the CAS rule in the House was 
that the statements would be ineffective and useless. This Article has 
shown why that assessment is mistaken. However, the rule requiring 
CASs is not as strong as it could be. This Part discusses several ways 
that Congress could make CASs stronger, and also some problems that 
would arise under those stronger regimes. 
The CAS rule currently exists only in the House of Representatives. 
Due to the low cost and good effects of the rule, the Senate would 
benefit from adopting some form of it as well. The considerations 
regarding several types of CAS rules discussed here apply equally to the 
House and the Senate. 
The reforms discussed here fall into two general categories, though 
there is some overlap between the categories. The first category consists 
of reforms that require or encourage increased deliberation about 
constitutional issues within Congress: (1) requiring CASs at several 
stages of the legislative process, and (2) requiring discussion of 
constitutional limits as well as powers. Reforms of this type would be 
very beneficial to ensure that a CAS actually starts a constitutional 
discussion when serious issues are raised. 
The second category consists of reforms that are designed to make 
constitutional authority statements more majoritarian and thus more 
influential with the courts: (1) requiring a separate floor vote on a CAS 
before the substance of the bill is voted on, and (2) putting the CAS in 
the text of the bill instead of legislative history. While these reforms 
would have some benefits, they also raise serious problems that counsel 
against their adoption. 
A.  Deliberation-Increasing Reforms 
The current rule requires that the Representative who introduces the 
bill must include a CAS. What happens if, after introduction, other 
Representatives believe the CAS is incorrect? What if amendments to 
the bill change or add to its constitutional basis? What if opponents 
want to draw attention to constitutional limits that they believe make the 
bill unconstitutional, but that are not addressed in the CAS? The rule in 
its present form makes no provision for changing a CAS after a bill has 
been introduced. 
                                                                                                                     
statutory interpretation rules). 
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A public and formal opportunity to change or object to a CAS would 
raise the incentives for constitutional deliberation.
167
 The opportunity 
for debate already exists under the current rule, but the lack of ability to 
rewrite the CAS may discourage members from raising their objections. 
If they cannot affect the content of the CAS, they may feel no need to 
air their concerns. Allowing the opportunity to amend the CAS creates 
an incentive to debate and decide the constitutional questions. This 
section suggests several ways that Congress could modify the CAS rule 
to provide a greater opportunity for deliberation and change. 
1.  Require CASs at Multiple Stages of the Legislative Process 
Prior to the adoption of the current CAS rule, the House of 
Representatives required that committee reports include a constitutional 
authority statement. This rule was adopted in the 105th Congress.
168
 It 
was retained in the House Rules until the 112th Congress, when it was 
replaced by the rule requiring CASs for all bills and joint resolutions at 
introduction.
169
 
The change from committee CASs to introduction CASs was 
portrayed as strengthening the Representatives‘ commitment to 
constitutional limits on government power.
170
 In some ways, that is true. 
Requiring a CAS at introduction puts more eyes on the Constitution, 
because a larger number of people are tasked with writing them. It also 
forces the sponsor of every bill to take personal responsibility for the 
constitutionality of that bill, instead of leaving it for consideration later. 
Additionally, the introduction rule means that Congress is making more 
statements about the Constitution overall, because only a fraction of the 
bills introduced ever receive committee reports. 
Most importantly, an introduction CAS means that a statement about 
the Constitution is available from the outset, and can be discussed and 
debated during committee meetings. By contrast, committee report 
CASs were probably often added by staffers after the bill was approved 
by the committee, without any prior discussion of constitutionality 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1304 (―[M]embers must be afforded an 
opportunity to raise constitutional issues and to deliberate about them fully.‖). 
 168. See H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. § 13(4) (1997) (―Each report of a committee on a bill or 
joint resolution of a public character shall include a statement citing the specific powers granted 
to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill or joint resolution.‖). 
 169. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress and 
striking the provision that previously required CASs in committee reports); H.R. Res. 5, 
Adopting Rules for the 112th Congress, Section-by-Section Analysis, http://rules.house.gov/ 
Media/file/PDF/HRes%205%20Sec-by-Sec.pdf, at 1 (explaining that the new rule ―repeals the 
current requirement for a similar [constitutional authority] statement in committee reports‖). 
 170. Most commonly, the new rule was portrayed as completely unprecedented, with the 
committee CAS rule never mentioned. 
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among the Representatives. The new rule places the constitutionality of 
the bill on the agenda from the time that committee members begin their 
consideration. They may choose not to discuss it, but the CAS serves as 
a reminder that they should think about it. 
In other ways, however, the rule change produces weaker 
constitutional authority statements. The introduction CASs are written 
by people with less expertise than those who wrote the committee 
CASs. The introduction CASs are thus less likely to be complete and 
accurate statements about the constitutionality of the bill.
171
 Also, a bill 
can change substantially between introduction and adoption by the 
committee, and even a perfect CAS for the introduced bill may not 
match up with the bill as it emerges from the committee. 
Committees and their staffs, in general, have a greater ability to 
write thorough CASs than individual members do. A committee has a 
larger staff than an individual Representative, and that staff is able to 
specialize in a particular subject matter of legislation. While various 
clauses of the Constitution may still be implicated in a single subject 
matter area, this narrows the field at least somewhat.
172
 Committees also 
generally have a longer period of time to consider legislation, and most 
of the discussion and debate about a bill goes on in committee 
meetings.
173
 Even more helpfully, committees frequently hold hearings 
in which experts, including experts on constitutional issues, can 
contribute to the deliberations.
174
 
There is an easy solution to these problems: CASs should be 
required both at introduction and in the committee report. The 
introduction CAS preserves the benefits of having many eyes on the 
Constitution and placing a statement of constitutionality on the agenda 
for committee discussions. The committee report CAS takes advantage 
of a more expert staff and the deliberations that happened in committee 
                                                                                                                     
 171. This is not universally true. A number of introduction CASs under the new rule are 
highly detailed. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H2107 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2011) (Constitutional 
Authority Statement for H.R. 1255 introduced by Representative Womack) (breaking down the 
constitutional authority for the bill section by section); 157 Cong. Rec. H2604 (daily ed. Apr. 
12, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 1474 introduced by Representative 
Duncan) (presenting extensive analysis and explanation of the constitutional authority for the 
bill, including the basis of an exemption for the postal service). 
 172. Garrett and Vermeule point out that specialized committees devoted to constitutional 
issues would do a better job of constitutional analysis than policy subject-matter committees. 
See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1319–22. That is certainly true. However, it would 
require a much larger change in the committee structure, and thus is less likely to be adopted. 
Reinstating the committee report CAS rule in addition to the introduction CAS rule requires no 
structural change to the committee system at all. 
 173. See id. at 1319. 
 174. See id. at 1304. 
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meetings to make the statement more thorough and lawyerly, 
incorporate any necessary changes after the bill is amended in 
committee, and put the full committee‘s stamp of approval on the 
statement. 
Requiring two CASs does not mean there will be twice as much 
work. The vast majority of bills are obviously constitutional. If the 
introduction CAS for a clearly constitutional bill is sufficient, the 
committee staff can copy it directly into the committee report. Even if 
the introduction CAS has some problems or omissions, the committee 
staff has something to start with. Additionally, only a small fraction of 
bills that are introduced are ever approved by committees. Bills that die 
in committee will never receive a committee report CAS. 
This is a case where the sum of the parts can be greater than the 
whole. Requiring both an introduction and a committee report CAS 
enhances both the opportunity and the incentives for constitutional 
deliberation in committees. If a CAS is required only at introduction, 
and is never formally changed, there is little incentive to discuss or 
object to it.
175
 If it is required only in the committee report, then the 
constitutional questions may not be noticed or discussed until after the 
committee deliberation is complete. When both are required, the 
introduction CAS serves as a reminder to discuss the constitutional 
aspects of the bill and a starting point for that discussion. Deliberation 
within the committee is encouraged because another CAS will be 
required in the committee report, this time with the backing of all the 
committee members. This structure encourages the most thoughtful and 
complete discussion of the constitutionality of each bill that moves 
through Congress. 
2.  Discussion of Constitutional Bars to Legislation 
The current CAS rule focuses Congress‘s attention only on its grants 
of authority, not on other clauses of the Constitution that set limits on 
the exercise of its powers. For a full debate of constitutionality, 
Congress must consider both.
176
 
It would be difficult to require constitutional problems to be 
identified from the outset. The sponsor of a bill is usually quite 
enthusiastic about the policy proposal and has no interest in drawing 
attention to potential problems, even if she does notice their existence. 
She may be simply introducing a policy idea rather than a fully formed 
legislative proposal, counting on the committee process to turn the idea 
                                                                                                                     
 175. See supra Section IV.A. 
 176. See supra Section II.D. 
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into a legally functioning and constitutionally compliant bill.
177
 And she 
probably is not an expert on constitutional doctrine that could cause 
problems for the bill, either. 
Some scholars have suggested that the parliamentarians of the House 
and Senate should identify constitutional issues in pending legislation 
and alert members of Congress to those issues.
178
 That would certainly 
be helpful, but as others have pointed out, even the most careful 
parliamentarian could easily miss some constitutional issues on an ex 
ante analysis.
179
  
A better solution is to create a formal procedure for any member to 
raise potential constitutional problems with a bill. This could be done 
through an amendment proposal to the CAS, through a separate 
procedure of registering an objection to the constitutionality of a bill, or 
by making CASs subject to a point of order to raise additional 
constitutional questions. Opponents of the bill, not the sponsor, will be 
most likely to search for constitutional problems. They may seek to use 
constitutional objections as a delaying tactic, so the procedure should be 
designed to prevent frivolous complaints from derailing a bill.
180
 But the 
primary advantage of allowing every member to raise formal 
constitutional objections is that it puts many eyes on the problem. 
Congress has a responsibility to act only within its limited power under 
the Constitution. Without constant attention to these limits, Congress is 
likely to overrun them.
181
  
                                                                                                                     
 177. For example, a representative may propose a bill to create a new regulatory body, 
leaving the institutional details of that body to be determined through committee deliberation. 
Some of those institutional details may raise constitutional questions. See Tushnet, supra note 9, 
at 506 n.32 (suggesting the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as an example of this 
form of constitutional problem). 
 178. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1308. 
 179. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 505 (―Sometimes constitutional issues lurk in the details 
of a complex statute, and particularly in interactions among apparently unrelated provisions. 
Even an astute parliamentarian might miss a fair number of non-trivial constitutional issues that 
arise in these ways.‖). 
 180. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1304–05 (―[T]he congressional structure 
for the consideration of constitutional questions should reflect a balance between the need to 
improve legislative capacity to discharge Congress‘s responsibility in this area and the need to 
enact legislation without undue delay or extreme difficulty . . . . [P]rocess can be used 
strategically by those unconcerned with constitutional issues to derail bills that they oppose on 
other grounds.‖). 
 181. See generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 805, 807–09 (2010) (arguing that in the absence of judicial review, members of Congress 
ignore legal limits on institutional behavior). 
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B.  Majoritarian Reforms 
Another drawback of the current CAS rule is that a CAS is the 
statement of only a single member of Congress. Changes could be made 
to the rule that would turn CASs into statements of the entire House of 
Representatives or the entire Congress.  
These proposals have certain advantages. They would require 
Congress as an institution to take a constitutional position, rather than 
simply requiring individual members to engage in some level of 
deliberation. That institutional statement would probably be given 
greater weight by the courts, even possibly increasing Congress‘s 
influence over the meaning of the Constitution relative to the other 
branches of government.  
However, there are also serious drawbacks. Requiring majority 
agreement is likely to lead to watered-down statements about the 
Constitution, making the constitutional claims less specific in order to 
create majority approval. Additionally, the level of agreement necessary 
to accomplish a congressional statement about the Constitution is even 
greater than the level of agreement necessary for the Supreme Court to 
hold a statute constitutional. These concerns counsel against adopting 
strong majoritarian CAS reforms. 
Not all majoritarian reform proposals are necessarily bad, however. 
The deliberation-increasing reforms discussed in the previous section 
also speak to some majoritarian concerns. Though they do not create a 
majority statement in favor of or against a CAS, they do draw a larger 
number of lawmakers into the constitutional deliberation and decision 
process. 
1.  Floor Votes for CASs 
One possible reform would be to require a procedural vote on 
adoption of a CAS immediately prior to voting on the text of a bill. To 
account for any amendments to the bill‘s text that are made on the floor, 
the CAS could be amendable on the floor and should not be voted on 
until the bill text is set.
182
 If a bill is changed in conference committee, 
the committee could also make any necessary changes to the CAS and 
resubmit it for a vote along with the conference version of the bill. In 
the strongest form of this rule, the CAS vote would not be waivable. 
Procedural votes are often used as ―test votes‖ to measure support 
for a bill, or as ways of blocking legislation before it comes to a 
substantive vote. A vote on a bill‘s CAS might be used in these ways 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 505–06 (―Sometimes constitutional issues arise from 
amendments proposed on the floor of the House or Senate, after the standard committee 
processes have been completed.‖). 
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also, with all the positives and negatives inherent in those 
possibilities.
183
 It is also easy to imagine this procedural vote becoming 
a mere formality, with nobody paying attention to the content of the 
CAS even as they vote to adopt it. 
A more troubling problem with requiring a majority vote on a CAS 
is that people might agree that a bill is constitutional while disagreeing 
about exactly why it is constitutional. One sees these disagreements in 
courts all the time, with judges concurring in the judgment but 
providing different reasons for their decisions. The problem is likely to 
arise even more frequently in Congress because the membership of 
Congress is so much larger than any court.  
Disagreement about reasons for constitutionality can lead to absurd 
results. Suppose that 40% of Representatives think that a certain bill is 
authorized as a regulation of interstate commerce and is not a tax, 40% 
think it is authorized as a tax and is not a regulation of commerce, and 
20% think the bill is unconstitutional. If a majority must approve the 
same CAS, the bill will not be able to pass, even though 80% of the 
House believes it is constitutional.  
One way of dealing with this problem would be to allow alternative 
CASs. No single clause can gain majority support, and nobody wants to 
vote for a CAS that endorses both clauses at the same time. Instead, 
Congress could allow two or more CASs to be voted on in the 
alternative, and as long as the votes in favor of the different options add 
up to a majority,
184
 the bill can be passed. 
Another possibility is to allow a bill to be enacted even if the 
majority disapproves of the CAS. This resolves a split-opinion situation 
like the one above without creating confusing procedural headaches. 
However, it also allows Congress to be irresponsible about the 
constitutionality of legislation. Congress could enact legislation that is 
preferred on policy grounds even when a majority believes it to be 
unconstitutional. It would not even have to be explicit about doing so, 
since it could always claim that a majority-unconstitutionality situation 
was actually a split-opinion one. Still, it forces members of Congress to 
take a position on the constitutional question separate from their 
position on the policy merits.
185
 It also exposes members to public 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 230 (2007) (offering a ―design 
principle‖ that mechanisms to increase constitutional deliberation in Congress should not 
―provid[e] opportunities for strategic action by coalitions seeking to derail bills that they oppose 
on other grounds‖). 
 184. An individual representative may be allowed to vote for more than one CAS, for 
example if she thinks that the bill is both a tax and a regulation of commerce, but she would 
only count as a single vote toward the majority support for constitutionality. 
 185. Cf. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1330 (―We think a separate vote [on 
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criticism, right or wrong, for voting to enact a bill while denying its 
constitutionality. Courts could also factor the lack of a majority-adopted 
CAS into their decision making. 
2.  CAS in Bill Text 
The strongest way for Congress to make its constitutional views 
binding and official is to put those views in the text of the bill. 
Textualists and nontextualists agree that the content of the statute itself 
is primary in statutory interpretation. It is a familiar aphorism that all 
interpretation must begin with the text of the statute.  
Nothing prevents Congress from putting statements about the 
Constitution in a bill voluntarily, and it has done so from time to 
time.
186
 This Subsection discusses the legal and practical issues 
surrounding a rule requiring Congress to do this for every bill it enacts. 
Such a rule has been proposed on numerous occasions,
187
 but it would 
give rise to more problems than benefits. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
waiving constitutional points of order], which disaggregates the lawmaker‘s stand on the 
constitutional issue from her final vote and eliminates or reduces her ability to explain away a 
troublesome position on the constitutional matter as a necessary evil to passing an omnibus bill 
with numerous provisions that her constituents like, is sufficient protection.‖). 
 186. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb4 
(2006), is a prominent example, but there are many others. The Trade Act of 1974, for example, 
states that the fast track process for enacting trade legislation is ―an exercise of the rulemaking 
power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively‖ and notes ―the 
constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that 
House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of 
that House.‖ Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006). The Affordable Care Act also has a 
provision addressing its own constitutionality. See Affordable Care Act § 1501(a)(3) (citing 
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)). 
 187. Proposals for this kind of rule have been floated before, but none has been enacted. 
Representative John Shadegg of Arizona introduced an Enumerated Powers Act in every 
Congress from the 104th until his retirement after the 111th Congress. These bills would have 
made a constitutional authority statement part of the text of all legislation. See H.R. 2270, 104th 
Cong. (1995); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); Enumerated Powers Act, 
H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 175, 107th Cong. (2001); 
Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 2458, 
109th Cong. (2005); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 1359, 110th Cong. (2007); Enumerated 
Powers Act, H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Enumerated Powers Act, S. 3159, 110th 
Cong. (2008) (introduced by Sen. Tom Coburn); Enumerated Powers Act, S. 1319, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (same). One resolution, sponsored by Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey, would 
have not only required a CAS in bill text, but banned reliance on the Common Defense Clause, 
General Welfare Clause, or Necessary and Proper Clause as a stand-alone authority. See H.R. 
Res. 1754, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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a.  Implementation 
The first question is what form such a rule could take. Congress 
might try to implement it through a chamber rule, just like the current 
CAS rule and the two prior possibilities discussed. The rule would be 
implemented most smoothly if both the House and Senate adopted the 
same requirement, but even adopting the rule in a single house could 
work. If the House had a strong, nonwaivable requirement that the text 
of each bill include a CAS, and the Senate did not, then the House 
would have to amend any bill originating in the Senate to insert one.
188
 
But it is unclear whether a chamber rule can dictate what must appear in 
the text of a bill. 
Another possibility is to enact a statute requiring a CAS to be 
included in every bill.
189
 There is some precedent for this type of 
requirement. Title One of the U.S. Code places certain requirements on 
the form and text of laws. Title One U.S.C. § 101 states: ―The enacting 
clause of all Acts of Congress shall be in the following form: ‗Be it 
enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled,‘‖190 and § 103 dictates that these 
words should be used only in the first section of an Act.
191
 However, it 
is unclear whether the courts would be willing to strike down a statute 
that did not have the proper enacting clause. No court has struck down a 
federal statute on the grounds of an absent enacting clause, but this is at 
least in part due to the fact that no statute has been challenged seriously 
on this ground.
192
 Many states have a constitutional enacting clause 
requirement, and state courts have invalidated legislation that lacks the 
required clause.
193
 
Even if § 101 is valid and binding, it is not completely analogous to 
a statutory CAS requirement. The enacting clause is purely formalistic 
and formulaic. It requires precise words that are identical for every 
                                                                                                                     
 188. In a weaker version of this rule, the House might only require a CAS for bills 
originating in the House. 
 189. See generally Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: 
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 
349–51 (2003) (discussion of the validity of statutes that dictate chamber rules).  
 190. 1 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 191. Id. § 103 (―No enacting or resolving words shall be used in any section of an Act or 
resolution of Congress except in the first.‖). 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Laroche, 170 Fed. App‘x 124 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
defendant did not prove enacting clause was absent); United States v. Petersen, 2009 WL 
3062013, at *8 n.9 (D. Minn. 2009) (slip copy) (holding that enacting clauses need not be 
codified in the U.S. Code because 1 U.S.C. § 101 applies only to original Acts); United States v. 
Ramanauskas, 2005 WL 189708, at *5 n.1 (D. Minn. 2005) (same). 
 193. See, e.g., People v. Dettenthaler, 77 N.W. 450, 453 (Mich. 1898) (concluding that law 
was invalid because enacting clause was inserted by clerk after it was passed). 
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statute passed by Congress. A CAS requirement would be more 
substantive and more variable, because different statutes draw authority 
from different parts of the Constitution. The statute would require 
substantive, individualized content to be included in each bill that 
becomes law, and would purport to prevent bills from becoming 
effective law without that content. 
A stronger analogy is an express reference provision. Congress has 
attempted to protect certain statutes from being repealed by implication 
in later statutes. To accomplish this, Congress included a provision in 
the protected statute announcing that any repeal of the statute must 
reference it specifically by name or section number.
194
 
Many scholars and judges take a skeptical view of Congress‘s ability 
to bind future Congresses through statutes.
195
 Thus, even if Congress 
were to pass a statute requiring CASs in all future statutes, it would be 
questionable whether the requirement was truly binding. Suppose there 
was a statutory CAS requirement, and Congress subsequently passed a 
statute that, intentionally or unintentionally, did not include a CAS. The 
second statute complied with all of the constitutional Article I, Section 7 
requirements for enacting laws, and was otherwise perfectly 
constitutional. Would that statute nonetheless be invalid because it did 
not include the CAS content? Or would the second statute be viewed as 
an implied repeal (or partial amendment) of the first one? A full 
exploration of these questions is well beyond the scope of this Article. I 
raise the issue here only to point out that one problem with a statutory 
CAS requirement is that despite taking the form of a statute, it may turn 
out to not be actually binding on Congress.
196
  
Nevertheless, a statute requiring a CAS in all subsequent statutes 
could be beneficial in the way the enacting clause statute is: it provides 
an entrenched standard format that can be easily followed. 
Congressional compliance with the enacting clause requirement is so 
universal that there has never been an opportunity to seriously challenge 
it. Compliance with express reference requirements has been somewhat 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2006) (―No other provision of law, enacted before, on, 
or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions 
of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.‖). 
 195. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 144–45 (2005) (holding that the 
phrase ―[n]otwithstanding any other provision of statute,‖ satisfies an express reference 
requirement despite the lack of any specific mention of the statute being repealed); id. at 147–50 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that express reference provisions are invalid because each new 
Congress has ―the power to make its will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate—
including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly contradicting them‖); 
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 165, at 99–100. 
 196. See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra note 165, at 107 (arguing that Congress 
cannot bind future Congresses). 
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lacking, partially due to the political benefits of repealing a popular 
statute without mentioning it and partially due to the difficulty of 
understanding all of the effects a new statute may have on prior laws.
197
 
On this dimension of comparison, a CAS requirement is more similar to 
the enacting clause requirement. It is a pro forma statement that would 
be required in every bill and need not refer to complex existing law. The 
enforceability of the CAS requirement is not relevant if Congress 
chooses to voluntarily comply, and there is every reason to think 
Congress largely would. 
b.  The Problem of the President 
Further questions arise after resolving how to implement the rule. 
All of the problems discussed above, in the section about requiring 
adoption of CASs by a procedural vote,
198
 apply equally if not more 
strongly when the CAS is put in the text of a bill. Additionally, the 
House and Senate will have to agree on the CAS in order to pass the 
bill. 
A more problematic possibility is that the President may not agree 
with the CAS. The President‘s institutional position as head of the 
Executive Branch naturally leads him to take different constitutional 
views than Congress on some issues. A tumultuous history of inter-
branch conflict attests to the likelihood of these disagreements. From 
the Bank of the United States, to military commissions for trying 
suspected terrorists, to the ban on using torture in interrogation, to the 
legislative veto, to the Defense of Marriage Act, presidents have 
frequently disagreed with Congress‘s constitutional decisions. The 
President will sometimes respond to this disagreement by vetoing 
legislation that he believes is unconstitutional. In recent decades, 
signing statements have become a prominent way for a president to sign 
legislation while simultaneously objecting to unconstitutional 
provisions or applications.
199
 
As an example of things the President might object to because of his 
institutional position, consider the CAS that was attached to the 
Restoring Essential Constitutional Constraints for Libyan Action 
Involving the Military Act: 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See Volokh, supra note 68, at 141–42 (discussing the difficulties inherent in analyzing 
the effects of legislation ex ante). 
 198. See supra Subsection IV.B.1. 
 199. See Christopher S. Kelley, The Law Contextualizing the Signing Statement, 37 
PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 737, 739–43 (2007) (recounting the development of the modern signing 
statement). 
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Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution states 
that Congress shall have the power ―To declare War,‖ ―To 
raise and support Armies,‖ ―To provide and maintain a 
Navy,‖ and ―To make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.‖ Although the 
Constitution‘s Article II, Section 2 designates the President 
as ―Commander in Chief,‖ that title does not empower the 
President to order congressionally unauthorized force when 
the United States has not been attacked or is not in 
imminent danger of attack. This bill reclaims Congress‘s 
core constitutional prerogative to control when offensive 
military force is used.
200
 
This is a view of the separation of war powers that is largely 
supported by scholars in the field, but it has been repeatedly challenged 
by other scholars and by the Executive Branch itself. A majority of 
Congress is likely to favor a CAS like this, but any President can be 
expected to disagree. 
If a CAS is included in the text of a bill, will the President‘s 
signature be read as an agreement with that CAS? Presumably it will, 
unless the President makes a statement objecting to the CAS. There are 
two different situations in which a President might disagree with a bill‘s 
CAS. First, he might think that the bill is wholly or partially 
unconstitutional. Second, he might think that the bill is constitutional, 
but is justified under a different clause than the one(s) cited by 
Congress. 
If a bill is entirely unconstitutional on its face, the President is 
obligated to veto it.
201
 But if the bill is unconstitutional only in part or in 
some applications, a President will often choose to sign it into law 
anyway.
202
 When a President chooses to sign a bill he believes is 
                                                                                                                     
 200. 157 Cong. Rec. H2037–38 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2011) (Constitutional Authority 
Statement for H.R. 1212 introduced by Representative Amash). 
 201. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 81 n.4 (2007) (―[I]f a bill is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications, the President must veto the underlying bill.‖). 
 202. This has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. See William Baude, Signing 
Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 304–05 (2011) (arguing that many bills have portions 
that are constitutionally required alongside portions that are unconstitutional, and that the 
President may sign such a bill); Prakash, supra note 201, at 81–82 (arguing that the President is 
obligated to veto a bill that has any unconstitutional part); Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113, 120–24 
(2007) (arguing that if the President believes a provision of a bill should not be enforced 
because it is unconstitutional, the President must veto that bill); Michael B. Rappaport, The 
President‟s Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 771–76 (1993) (arguing that the 
President violates the Constitution when signing an unconstitutional bill into law). 
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partially unconstitutional, there is a risk that he will be misunderstood 
as believing that the bill is completely constitutional. This 
misunderstanding can be problematic, because the Supreme Court often 
gives some amount of deference to the combined judgment of Congress 
and the President about constitutionality. Thus, it is important for the 
President to make his constitutional views known when they differ from 
Congress‘s.  
Signing statements can accomplish this to some extent. However, 
judges have never given signing statements much weight in statutory 
interpretation,
203
 despite the intent of the Office of Legal Counsel to 
promote signing statements as a counterweight to legislative history,
204
 
and the views of some scholars that they should be taken seriously.
205
 
The President is generally seen as being outside the legislative 
process,
206
 even though he has a significant constitutional and practical 
role in crafting and enacting legislation.
207
 Additionally, signing 
statements have been condemned as post-enactment legislative history, 
one of the least favored types of legislative history.
208
  
                                                                                                                     
 203. See Nicholas J. Leddy, Note, Determining Due Deference: Examining When Courts 
Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 871–72 
(2007) (―When federal courts refer to signing statements, they often cite to them as a minor 
piece of legislative history or use them as one factor in analyzing a particular statute. Rarely, if 
ever, do courts use the signing statement‘s interpretation of legislation as controlling.‖). 
 204. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel to the Litig. Strategy Working Grp., Using Presidential Signing Statement to 
Make Fuller Use of the President‟s Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting 
Law, (Feb. 5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-
269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf (advocating the use of 
signing statements as a way to increase Executive Branch influence over statutory 
interpretation). 
 205. Compare Paul T. Stepnowsky, Note, Deference to Presidential Signing Statements in 
Administrative Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1086, 1098–1100 (2010) (arguing that signing 
statements should receive Skidmore deference), with Leddy, supra note 203, at 882–84 (arguing 
against deference to agencies that rely heavily on signing statements in their decision-making). 
 206. See generally Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as 
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 363, 365–68 (1987) (objecting to signing statements largely on separation of powers 
grounds). 
 207. See Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2002) (arguing that the Recommendation Clause, the State of the Union requirement, 
and the veto power give the President a significant legislative role). 
 208. See Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 597, 606–08 (2006) (arguing that judges should not give much weight to signing 
statements in statutory interpretation). But see Laura McDonald, Note, The Interpretive Worth of 
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Form of Legislative History, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
179, 193–202 (2010) (taking a more favorable approach to signing statements as legislative 
history useful for judicial interpretation). 
53
Volokh: Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
226 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Signing statements are thus disfavored in comparison with 
legislative history. They are likely to be even more disfavored in 
comparison with constitutional statements that appear in the enacted bill 
text itself. And rightly so—statements that are approved through the 
constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment have legal 
authority, whereas the statements of a single branch of government are 
simply opinions.  
Including CASs in the text of legislation, therefore, would increase 
Congress‘s influence over constitutional interpretation relative to the 
President. Of course, the President might be able to exert influence over 
the CAS during the process of negotiation over the pending bill. 
However, it would be surprising if the President put more emphasis on 
the CAS than on the substantive content of the bill, which is likely to 
have a larger practical effect, particularly in the short term. The 
President is unlikely to use his limited bargaining power to change a 
CAS rather than to change substantive content that he objects to. 
c.  Costs and Benefits of a Statutory CAS 
The major benefit of including a CAS in statutory text is that it 
becomes law. If Congress wants its statements about the Constitution to 
be as legal and binding as possible, putting them in statutory text is the 
way to accomplish that. However, the costs of putting CASs in statutory 
text are substantial, and probably outweigh the benefits. 
First, a statutory CAS demands too much agreement. A majority of 
the House and a majority of the Senate must agree on the same 
constitutional authority for each bill, and then the President must agree 
when signing the bill into law (alternatively, two-thirds of each house 
could agree to pass it over the President‘s veto). But, as discussed 
above,
209
 there is no reason to demand that everyone agree on precisely 
why a statute is constitutional. Judges routinely concur in the same 
judgment with different constitutional reasoning. There is no good 
reason to demand majority agreement in Congress, or agreement 
between Congress and the President, about what the precise 
constitutional authority for any given statute is. It is enough that they 
agree that some part of the Constitution authorizes the statute. 
Second, requiring majority agreement on a CAS may actually 
dampen constitutional discussion instead of enhancing it. The truly 
important result of CASs is discussion about the Constitution, not 
agreement about the Constitution. That discussion gives life to our 
democratic process of constitutional government. Members of Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See supra Section IV.B. 
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should be thinking actively about the Constitution while they do their 
jobs.  
When Congress knows that it must reach agreement on a 
constitutional question in order to enact legislation that it desires on the 
merits, it is likely to adopt a general, non-controversial CAS. Instead of 
choosing a particular clause, Congress may choose to repeatedly cite 
Article I, Section 8, the source of most of the specific grants of 
congressional authority. Nobody who supports the legislation on its 
merits will have incentive to object, because disagreement on the CAS 
could derail passage of the desired legislation. 
In contrast, if a CAS is only a legislative history statement and 
majority agreement is not required, a thousand flowers can bloom. 
There is no harm in a member of Congress coming to the floor to state, 
―The CAS for this bill says it‘s a regulation of interstate commerce. I 
don‘t believe the Commerce Clause stretches so far. I believe this bill is 
a tax, and it is justified under the congressional power to lay and collect 
taxes for the general welfare.‖ 
Finally, courts might see statutory CASs as an affront to their own 
interpretive authority. If CASs are only in legislative history, the courts 
might use them or ignore them as they see fit. But if CASs are in 
statutory text, purporting to be binding on courts, the courts might begin 
to feel a bit defensive. Courts have frowned upon congressional 
disagreement with judicial constitutional interpretation in the past.
210
 
Congress could easily weaken its own position by pushing a 
confrontation with the Supreme Court on this issue. A better strategy for 
Congress is to build up its credibility as a constitutional interpreter by 
actively debating the Constitution during its own legislative 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article answered only a few of the many interesting questions 
raised by constitutional authority statements. The existence of CASs 
gives scholars, the public, and the courts a window into how members 
of Congress think about the Constitution. This window should not be 
closed; it should be opened further. Scholars should examine the content 
and effects of CASs. The House of Representatives should retain this 
                                                                                                                     
 210. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997) (striking down a statute 
that attempted to impose Congress‘s own constitutional interpretation instead of the Supreme 
Court‘s prior interpretation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958) (declaring that the 
Supreme Court is the supreme interpreter of the Constitution); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in 
Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 82–83 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs 
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (1995). 
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rule in future sessions, preferably with some of the modifications 
suggested here. The Senate would do well to adopt a similar rule. 
Constitutional authority statements are a form of constitutional 
interpretation outside the courts. Almost all commentators agree 
Congress has a responsibility to pay attention to the constitutionality of 
its enactments, though they disagree on whether Congress should 
analyze the Constitution for itself or heed the judgments of the Supreme 
Court. Under either definition, constitutional authority statements are a 
tool for ensuring the constitutionality of legislation. 
CASs are primarily useful for Congress itself, in its internal 
deliberations. While the courts may choose to look at them to a certain 
extent, they are a decidedly weak form of legislative history, coming at 
the beginning of the legislative process and approved by only a single 
member. These features make them less useful for judicial 
interpretation, but much more useful for kickstarting deliberations 
within Congress. Having a statement of constitutionality available at the 
outset of discussions over a policy proposal reminds members that they 
should consider whether they agree or disagree with that statement. 
When a bill does present constitutional problems, members should be 
less likely to ignore it when a constitutional authority statement is 
presented to them before discussions begin. 
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